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The question of the contemporary status of parliamentary sovereignty is a significant and 
vexed one. The doctrine’s status in Scotland has been a vexed academic issue for centuries. 
It has been further problematized by the inception of the Scottish Parliament and the recent 
Scottish Independence Referendum. The central question of this work is: can Westminster 
abolish the Scottish Parliament unilaterally? This issue will be explored in five parts. The 
first section will consist of a broad discussion of sovereignty, focusing on the classical 
debates regarding Westminster’s sovereignty and the question of whether Scotland 
possessed a distinct tradition of popular sovereignty prior to entering the Union. The work 
will then examine the events of the 1980s and 1990s and argue that it represented a 
constitutional step change in Scotland. The work will then explore the constitutional and 
political meaning of referendums, before  the theories of constitutional unsettlement and 
constitutional moments. 
 
The central contention of this work is that, whilst a distinctly Scottish approach to 
sovereignty did not exist until the 1990s, the political rupture created by the Conservative 
government of the 1980s and 1990s acted as a constitutional moment, crystalized in the 
1997 Referendum on Devolution, which politically entrenched the Scottish Parliament’s 
status in the Scottish and British constitutional orders. The 2014 Referendum confirmed 
the political necessity for recourse to popular sovereignty on profound constitutional 
issues. This, however, has not been reflected in law. Westminster retains the theoretical 
capacity to abolish the Scottish Parliament. In reality, this is an almost meaningless power, 
but the power cannot be removed without destroying parliamentary sovereignty itself. The 
state of constitutional unsettlement that the United Kingdom continues to exist in means 
that there is little hope for formal settlement of this issue, even taking into account the 
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Chapter 1: Parliamentary Sovereignty in Scotland Today 
 
“Lord have mercy upon my poor countrey that is so barbarously oppressed!”1 
 
“It will be a decisive shift in the balance of power in Britain, a long overdue 
transfer of sovereignty from those who are governed, from an ancient and 
indefensible Crown sovereignty to a modern popular sovereignty.”2  
 
The constitutional accommodation of Scotland within the United Kingdom has been an 
issue for as long as there has been a United Kingdom. More recently, the constitutional 
status of the Scottish Parliament is an issue of significant contemporary importance. It 
formed part of the debate surrounding the recent Scottish Independence Referendum and 
was included as one of the Smith Commission’s proposals, incorporated in the Draft 
Scotland Clauses proposed by the UK Government.3 Similarly, sovereignty – and, in 
particular, parliamentary sovereignty – is an increasingly contested concept within the 
United Kingdom and internationally.4  
 
The UK has traditionally been regarded as a unitary state, as opposed to a federal one.5  
The origins of parliamentary supremacy as well as the relationships between the Crown, 
courts and Parliament, were somewhat different in pre-Union Scotland and England.6  
Both countries entered the union voluntarily and negotiated their terms of entry. These 
terms make clear that Scotland possesses its own distinct civic society, and, most 
importantly, its own courts and legal system. MacCormick is right to say that there “is no 
doubt that we have a single state, but it is at least possible that we have two interpretations, 
two conceptions, two understandings, of the constitution of that state.”7  
 
                                                             
1 Andrew Fletcher quoted in ‘Letters of Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun and his Family 1717-16’, History 
Society, Miscellany of History Society, Vol. X (Scottish History Society 1965). 
2 Gordon Brown, ‘Constitutional Change and the Future of Britain’ (Charter88 Sovereignty Lecture, London, 
9 March, 1992).  
3 Clause 1, Draft Scotland Clauses 2015 featured in Scotland Office, Scotland in the United Kingdom: An 
Enduring Settlement (Cm 8990, 2015) 92. 
4 See Martin Loughlin and Petra Dobner (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (OUP 2010) and Nico 
Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (OUP 2010). 
5 Anthony Bradley and Keith Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law (15th ed Longman 2010) 40. 
6 Adam Tomkins, ‘The Constitutional Law in MacCormick v Lord Advocate’ (2004) JR 213-224. 
7 Neil MacCormick, ‘Is There a Constitutional Path to Independence?’ 2000 Parliamentary Affairs 721, 727. 
Although this is a relatively modern view and not one that necessarily sits well with the whole of the UK, see 
Colin Kidd, Union and Unionisms (CUP 2008) 115. 
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With this in mind, it can be suggested that the United Kingdom is a union state, with 
alternative interpretations of the constitution available in different parts of the state.8 In this 
“pluri-constitutive state”9 a distinct tradition of popular sovereignty in Scotland is 
possible.10  
 
Some have suggested that the advent of the Scottish Parliament is inherently and legally 
permanent.11 This work will focus on the Scottish Parliament’s institutional challenge, 
along with the effect of referendums, to parliamentary sovereignty. The first section will 
consist of a broad discussion of sovereignty, focusing on the classical debates regarding 
Westminster’s sovereignty and the question of whether Scotland possessed a distinct 
tradition of popular sovereignty prior to entering the Union. The second chapter will 
examine the events of the 1980s and 1990s and argue that it represented a constitutional 
step change in Scotland. The third chapter will examine the approaches adopted by the 
Scottish and British supreme courts in relation to devolution. The fourth section will 
explore the constitutional and political meaning of referendums. The fifth chapter will 
discuss the theories of constitutional unsettlement and constitutional moments, before 
concluding that the Scottish Parliament is politically entrenched by the 1997 Referendum 
and the constitutional compact contained in the events of the “constitutional moment” of 
the 1980s and 1990s. This entrenchment profoundly challenges traditional conceptions of 
parliamentary sovereignty, but the doctrine cannot formally accommodate legal 
entrenchment. It will conclude by arguing that this reflects and exacerbates the 
constitutional unsettlement in which the United Kingdom currently operates, but that this is 
not necessarily a negative development. 
                                                             
8 Rodney Brazier, ‘The Constitution of the United Kingdom’ (1999) 58 C.L.J 56, Neil Walker ‘Beyond the 
Unitary Conception of the United Kingdom?’ P.L. 2000, Aut, 384-40,4 and David Feldman, ‘One, None or 
Several? Perspectives on the UK’s Constitution(s)’ C.L.J. 2005 64(2), 329-351. 
9 Neil Walker, ‘Out of Place and Out of Time: Law’s Shifting Co-ordinates’ Edin. L.R. 2010, 14(1),13-46. 
10 Peter Speirs, ‘The People in the Modern Scottish Constitution’, Edinburgh Student Law Review Vol. II Iss. 
II, 1-16. 
11 Noreen Burrows, Devolution (Sweet and Maxwell 2000) 56-65. 
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Chapter 2: Parliamentary Sovereignty: Theory and Reality in Scotland 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty, or legislative supremacy, the idea that an Act of Parliament is 
the highest source of law in the United Kingdom, is central to the British constitution. A 
thorough understanding of the doctrine and its history is necessary to appreciate its 
contemporary application in Scotland. Whether the Scottish devolution arrangements have 
attained the degree of permanence necessary to have created a new limitation on 
Westminster’s legislative supremacy is a matter of political fact and will be assessed later 
in this work. The questions for this chapter are what the doctrine means, what its status has 
traditionally been in Scotland and whether it is possible for a limitation to be expressed in 
legal fact, as suggested by the former Prime Minister, Gordon Brown,12 rather than as a 




The doctrine of legislative supremacy can be stated in a variety of ways. It has been 
variously defined as “the absence of any legal restraint upon the legislative power of the 
United Kingdom Parliament”13, “legislative power that is legally unlimited”14, and as 
constituting “what Parliament doth no authority upon earth can undo… Parliament can do 
anything that is not physically impossible.”15 No matter how it is worded, it is irrefutably a 
very broad authority. It can be contrasted with the powers of legislatures in most other 
jurisdictions, whose legislation is subject to judicial review and possible reduction by a 
supreme court.16 
 
The modern form of legislative supremacy is justified on democratic grounds.17 Its 
normative power stems from the fact that ‘the supremacy of power conferred on 
                                                             
12 Gordon Brown, My Scotland, Our Britain: A Future worth Sharing (Simon and Schuster 2014) 242-3. 
13 JDB Mitchell, Constitutional Law (2nd edn W Green and Son 1964) 64. 
14 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: Contemporary Debates (CUP 2010) 57. 
15 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England I (first published 1765, Routledge 2001) 160-
161. 
16 Richard Bauman and Tsvi Kahana (eds), The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the 
Constitutional State (CUP 2006). 
17 Anthony Bradley, ‘The Sovereignty of Parliament – Form or Substance?’ in Jefrey Jowell and Dawn 
Oliver (eds) The Changing Constitution (6th edn OUP 2007) 41-42. For a contrary view, see Dawn Oliver, 
‘Parliament and the Courts: A Pragmatic (or Principled) Defence of the Sovereignty of Parliament’ in 
Alexander Horne, Gavin Dewry and Dawn Oliver (eds), Parliament and the Law (Hart 2013). 
9 
Parliament by the unwritten constitution of the United Kingdom [is] subject to 




The formalisation of the doctrine owes much to AV Dicey.19 He is parliamentary 
sovereignty’s “chief ideologist.”20 Even though Dicey’s depiction of legislative supremacy 
has largely fallen out of favour with public lawyers, “they argue within an intellectual 
framework that he largely created.”21 His treatment of the subject remains the starting 
point for any discussion of legislative supremacy throughout the United Kingdom.22 As an 
empiricist, Dicey was concerned not with theorising about constitutional doctrine, but 
attempted to “state what are the laws which form part of the constitution, to arrange them 
in their order, to explain their meaning, and to exhibit where possible their logical 
connection.”23 This analytical process led him to his much-quoted axioms, that legislative 
supremacy is the “very keystone of the law of the constitution”24 and the “dominant 
characteristic of our political institutions”.25 The term Parliamentary sovereignty was 
Dicey’s, but it is effectively interchangeable with legislative supremacy.  
 
Dicey found the English constitution to be centred on three interconnected principles: 
legislative supremacy, the “universal” rule of law and constitutional conventions.26 
Legislative supremacy means:  
 
no more nor less than… that Parliament… has, under the English constitution, the 
right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further that no person or body is 
recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the 
legislation of Parliament.27  
                                                             
18 Nottinghamshire County Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1986] 1 AC 240, 265 per Lord 
Templeman. 
19 AV Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (First published 1889, 8th edn 
Macmillan 1918) 
20 Richard Bellamy, 'Political Constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act’ 109 CON (2011), Vol. 9 No. 1, 
86–111, 87 
21 Iain Maclean, What’s Wrong with the British Constitution? (OUP 2010) 21. 
22 Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (OUP 1992) 140-168. 
23 AV Dicey, The Law of the Constitution supra 31. 
24 Ibid 70. 
25 Ibid 39. 
26 Ibid 35. 
27 Ibid 39-40. Goldsworthy believes the positive aspect to be redundant and the distinction between the two 




Here, the positive and negative aspects of sovereignty are denoted: Parliament may make 
any law it so wishes and no other authority may “override or derogate from an Act of 
Parliament.”28 
 
Only a specific form of legislation is supreme: it must be an Act supported by a majority 
vote in the Houses of Commons and Lords which then receives the Assent of the monarch. 
In other words, it is not Parliament that is supreme, but the “Queen in Parliament”.29 This 
is not mere pedantry: Parliament produces a multitude of other publications and secondary 
instruments that are not deemed to be constitutionally supreme.30 
 
2.1.2 Limitations on the Principle 
 
In spite of some of the caricatures of his work, Dicey saw beyond strict legal absolutism 
and recognized limitations on parliamentary sovereignty: 
 
Lawyers are apt to speak as though the legislature were omnipotent… but it is 
limited, so to speak, both from within and from without; from within, because the 
legislature is the product of a certain social condition, and determines by whatever 
determines the society; and from without, because the power of imposing laws is 
dependent upon the instinct of subordination.31 
 
These are generally termed the internal and external limitations on parliamentary 
sovereignty. The external limitation is related to obedience to law. Even “under the most 
despotic monarchies”32 laws must receive general obedience amongst the populace. Citing 
David Hume’s belief that “the governors have nothing to support them but [public] 
opinion”33, Dicey asserted that Parliament must consider whether a law is likely to be 
broadly accepted by the people. Jennings reduced this to “Parliament passes many laws 
                                                             
28 Dicey, The Study of the Law of the Constitution n.19, 40. 
29 Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (5th edn University of London Press 1964) 160. 
30 Delegated and secondary legislation is amenable to judicial review. See R (Bancoult No 2) v Foreign 
Secretary [2007] EWCA Civ 498. See Pavlos Eleftheriadis, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Constitution’ 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence Vol. XXII, No.2 (July 2009).     
31 Dicey, The Law of the Constitution n.19, 76 
32 Ibid 77. 
33 David Hume, Essays, Moral, Political and Literary (Longman 1875) vol. I, 109-110 quoted by Dicey, The 
Law of the Constitution n.19, 77. 
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which many people do not want. But it never passes any laws which any substantial 
section of the population violently dislikes.”34  
 
The internal limit is a consequence of the social limitations of those involved in the 
legislative process. Societal norms and established practices limit what legislators consider 
acceptable topics and content of legislation. Dicey described it as ‘the moral feeling of the 
times and the society.’35 
 
These limitations are intimately related to Dicey’s theoretical division of political from 
legal sovereignty. Political sovereignty lies with the people and is closely related to the 
doctrine of the mandate.36 Dicey’s conception of legislative supremacy was concerned 
with legal sovereignty, that is, the power to make laws. 
 
It can be inferred from this that whilst, as a matter of legal form, Parliament possesses the 
competence to legislate as it wishes, there exist immanent and external practical limitations 
on its actual ability to legislate. Identifying what these are is not always easy, but the 
democratic relationship between the House of Commons and the people and what 
Members of Parliament and the government believe the public will deem acceptable 
legislation creates a limitation on Parliament’s practical power to legislate. Dicey’s 
distinction between the legal sovereignty of Parliament and the political sovereignty of the 
people neatly expresses the relationship between the people as an ultimate check on any 
extreme behaviour from Parliament.  
 
According to Dicey, where Parliament operates properly by channeling the will of the 
people, however, these limitations effectively disappear: 
 
The difference between the will of the sovereign and the will of the nation was 
terminated by the foundation of a system of real representative government. Where 
a Parliament really represents the people, the divergence between the external and 
the internal limit to the exercise of sovereign power can hardly arise, or if it arises 
must soon disappear. 37 
 
                                                             
34 Jennings, The Law n.29 143. 
35 The Law of the Constitution, n.19, 74. 
36 Ian Loveland, The Constitution of the United Kingdom: A contextual Analysis (2nd edn Hart 2012) 45. 
37 The Law of the Constitution n.19, 77. 
12 
Craig claims that “Dicey’s theories were themselves explicitly premised upon certain 
assumptions concerning representative democracy and the way in which it 
operated…”38 In another work he noted that 
  
The Diceyan conception of sovereignty is therefore firmly embedded within a 
conception of self-correcting majoritarian democracy. Representative government 
would necessarily produce a coincidence between the external and internal limits 
of sovereign power in much the same way that the invisible hand of the market 
ensured a correspondence of supply and demand.39 
 





For Professor Hart, the Queen in Parliament’s legislative supremacy formed the British 
constitution’s rule of recognition. This “specif[ies] some feature or features possession of 
which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of 
the group to be supported by the social pressure it exerts.”40 Hart believed that “a great 
proportion of ordinary citizens – perhaps a majority – have no general conception of the 
legal structure or its criteria of validity.”41 Therefore, the rule by which valid laws may be 
discerned is a function of what is accepted by those who do possess intimate knowledge of 
constitutional praxis, the predominate representatives of the three branches of state. What 
forms the rule of recognition “depends upon a morally neutral description of whichever 
standard of official behaviour officials accept at any given point in time.42 Hart is clear, 
therefore, that “what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law” constitutes the relevant rule of 
recognition of the British constitution.43 
 
Hart distinguished between two approaches to the meaning of Parliament’s sovereignty. 
The first, “continuing” sovereignty, was described by “older constitutional theorists… 
                                                             
38 Paul Craig ‘Unitary, Self-Correcting Democracy and Public Law’ (1990) 106 LQR 105, 109 
39 Paul Craig, Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and the United States of America (OUP 
1991) 15. 
40 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (3rd edn OUP 2012) 79. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Stuart Lakin, ‘Debunking the Idea of Parliamentary Sovereignty: The Controlling Factor of Legality in the 
British Constitution’ (2008) OJLS 709, 717. 
43 Hart, supra 107. 
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[u]nder the influence of the Austinian doctrine that law is essentially the product of a 
legally untrammelled will” as 
 
if it was a logical necessity that there should be a legislature which was sovereign, 
in the sense that it is free, at every moment of it existence as a continuing body, not 
only from legal limitations imposed ab extra, but also from its own prior 
legislation…44 
 
The alternative, which he called “self-limiting” sovereignty, is  
 
the principle that Parliament should not be incapable of limiting irrevocably the 
legislative competence of its successors but, on the contrary, should have this wider 
self-limiting power. Parliament would at least once in its history be capable of 
exercising an even larger sphere of legislative competence than the accepted 
established doctrine allows to it.45 
 
Continuing sovereignty is the classical exposition of legislative supremacy. Although it is 
often presented as a matter of pure logic,46 Hart viewed this conception as “only one 
interpretation of the ambiguous idea of legal omnipotence” and believed its veracity an 
“empirical question.”47 Hart found continuing sovereignty to be the applicable rule of 
recognition of the United Kingdom. Hart does not view rules of recognition as entirely 
static or fixed. Constitutional dynamism, by which the rule of recognition is changed or 
supplanted, is provided for by the empirical nature of establishing what constitutes the rule 
of recognition.48 If the majority of officials from Parliament, the executive and the courts 
agree that the rule of recognition has changed, then it has changed. This, by definition, 
cannot be completed unilaterally. 
 
For Wade “if no statute can establish the rule that the courts obey Acts of Parliament, 
similarly no statute can alter or abolish that rule. The rule is above and beyond the reach of 
statute… because it itself is the source of the authority of statute.”49 This statement of the 
traditional, continuing view of sovereignty, is in line with Dicey’s belief that Parliament’s 
                                                             
44 Ibid 149. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Dicey, The the Law of the Constitution n.19, 69. 
47 The Concept of Law n.40. 149-50. 
48 Ibid 92 
49 William Wade, ‘The Basis of Legal Sovereignty’ [1955] CLJ 172, 188. 
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inability to pass “immutable laws” lies “deep in the history of the English people and in the 
peculiar development of the English Constitution.”50  
 
2.2 Implied Repeal: Continuing and self-embracing Sovereignty 
 
Dicey did not dwell on these limitations or philosophical justifications for parliamentary 
sovereignty, as they were “tangential to his main concerns and to the central thrust of his 
argument.”51 He did, however, believe that the only legal limitation on Parliament’s 
powers was that it could not bind its successors. This was thought to be axiomatic by 
Dicey and many others. In the seventeenth century case of Godden v Hales, the court held 
that  “… [I]f an act of parliament had a clause in it that it should never be repealed yet 
without question, the same power that made it, may repeal it…”52 
 
Under this view, for a Parliament to possess true sovereignty it must be able to legislate for 
any end it wishes and cannot be encumbered by pre-ordained limitations on its ability to 
legislate. It also cannot be limited by the legislation of past Parliaments. Stair was 
unequivocal that “Parliament can never exclude the full liberty of themselves, or their 
successors…  for, whatever a Parliament can do at one time, in making laws, or 
determining of causes, may be at their pleasure abrogate or derogate.”53 . The doctrine of 
implied repeal is a judicial expression of this view.54 
 
Wade recognised the ability of judicial loyalty to change from one interpretation of 
legislative supremacy to another. He acknowledged the potential for legal “revolutions” 
and “breaks of continuity”, such as in America in the eighteenth century. He also 
recognised the potential for more gradual change: 
 
Even without such discontinuity there might be a shift of judicial loyalty if we take 
into account the dimension of time… Suppose… that Parliament scrupulously 
observed [a] rule for 50 or 100 years, so that no conflicting legislation came before 
the courts. Meanwhile new generations of judges might come to accept that there 
had been a new constitutional settlement based on common consent and long 
                                                             
50 Dicey, The Law of the Constitution n.19, 69. 
51 Anthony King, The British Constitution (OUP 2007) 35. 
52 (1686) 11 St Tr 1165 (KB) per Herbert CJ. 
53 Inst. IV, 1, 61. Erskine agreed on this matter, see Inst. I, 1, 19. 
54 Iain Loveland, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights: A Critical Introduction (5th Ed 
OUP 2012) 37. 
15 
usage, and that the old doctrine of sovereignty was ancient history… The judges 
would then be adjusting their doctrine to the facts of constitutional life, as they 
have done throughout history.55 
 
Turpin and Tomkins note that it may take “a much shorter time than fifty or a hundred 
years” for such a change to take place.56 
 
2.2.1 The New View 
 
It is accepted that it is possible, therefore, for the position to change. Advocates of the so-
called ‘new-view’ or self-embracing theory, like Ivor Jennings, have argued that 
Parliament can limit the content and procedure by which legislation may be passed.57 For 
Jennings, because legislative supremacy is, in his view, a product of the common law and 
courts have accepted that statute is superior to the common law, Parliament can instruct the 
courts that certain legislation may only be repealed in a certain way.58 
 
Much of the evidence for this position comes from Parliaments other than Westminster. 
Cases such as Trethowan,59 Harris v Minister for the Interior60 and Bribery Commissioner 
v Ranasinghe61 are proffered as evidence for this position. These cases relate to Dominion 
legislatures, and the cases in which this question arose in relation to Westminster, those of 
Ellen Street Estates v Minister for Health62 and Vauxhall Estates Ltd v Liverpool 
Corporation,63 the courts rejected the claim that Parliament can bind itself. In Ellis Street 
Maugham LJ summed up the traditional view when he said that  
 
the Legislature cannot, according to our constitution, bind itself as to the form of 
subsequent legislation, and it is impossible for Parliament to enact that in a 
                                                             
55 William Wade, Constitutional Fundamentals (Stevens 1980) 37. 
56 Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution (7th Ed CUP 2011) 74. 
57 See RFV Heuston, Essays in Constitutional Law 2nd ed (Universal Law Publishing 1999), Jennings, The 
Law and the Constitution n.29, George Winterton, 'The British Grundnorm: Parliamentary Sovereignty re-
examined' [1976] 92 LQ Rev 591, and Paul Craig ‘Sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament after 
Factortame’ [1991] 11 Yearbook of European Law 221. 
58 Jennings, The Law n.29, 156-163. 
59 Attorney-General for New South Wales v Trethowan [1932] AC 526 
60 1952(2) SA 428(AD). 
61 [1965] AC 172. 
62 [1934] 1 KB 590. 
63 [1932] 1 KB 733 and discussed in Han-Ru Zhou, “Revisiting the ‘Manner and Form’ Theory of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty” 129 LQR 610-638.  
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subsequent statute dealing with the same subject matter there can be no implied 
repeal.64 
 
These cases, however, were decided relatively narrowly and did not seek to expound 
absolute and immutable constitutional doctrine; they were statements of the law as it stood 




The issue was discussed more recently by several judges in obiter remarks in Jackson.65 
Lord Hope rejected the idea absolutely in saying:  
 
it is a fundamental aspect of the rule of sovereignty that no Parliament can bind its 
successors. There are no means by whereby, even with the assistance of the most 
skilful draftsman, it can entrench an Act of Parliament. It is impossible for 
Parliament to enact something which a subsequent statute dealing with the same 
subject matter cannot repeal.66  
 
On the other hand, Lord Steyn argued that “Parliament acting as ordinarily constituted may 
functionally redistribute legislative power in different way”, and approvingly quoted an 
academic who said that 
 
…the very power of constitutional alteration cannot be exercised except in the form 
and manner which the law for the time being prescribes. Unless the Legislature 
observes that manner and form, its attempt to alter its constitution is void. It may 
amend or abrogate for the future the law which prescribes that form or that 
manner. But, in doing so, it must comply with its very requirements.67  
 
Although these matters were discussed in obiter remarks and Baroness Hale and Lord 
Steyn’s views were in the minority, the very fact that senior members of the British 
judiciary disagree on a topic as fundamental as this is significant and demonstrates the 
disputed nature of the legislative supremacy in the contemporary constitutional order.  
                                                             
64 Ellis, n.62, 597. 
65 R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56; [2006] 1 AC 262. 
66 Ibid para 113. 
67 Owen Dixon, ‘The Law and the Constitution’ 51 LQR 590, 601 quoted in Jackson supra  para 81. 
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Maughum’s dictum in Ellis Streets goes beyond the what was strictly under question in 
that case – whether Parliament can bind its successors as to the content of future legislation 
– and claims that it cannot bind its successors as to the form of future legislation, that is the 
procedure by which legislation may be passed. This manner and form argument is central 
to the new view. Goldsworthy takes the position that as the process outlined in something 
like the Parliament Acts is less restrictive than the ordinary procedure it is merely an 
example of Parliament “expandi[ing] its powers”, thus demonstrating its sovereignty.68 
This is substantively different to an instance in which Parliament limits its own powers. 
The preponderance of judicial and political opinion currently appears to be that Parliament 
is not able to bind its successors on either the content or the manner and form of future 
legislation.69 As Loveland put it, ‘Parliament’s unconfined legislative power is created 
anew every time it meets, irrespective of what previous Parliaments have enacted.70 
 
2.3 Constitutional Statutes and the Challenge of the Common Law 
 
In Thoburn v Sunderland City Council71 Laws LJ introduced a new classification of 
statutes. In this so-called Metric Martyrs case, he held that some statutes are constitutional 
in nature and should only be subject to express repeal by Parliament: 
 
We should recognise a hierarchy of Acts of Parliament: as it were "ordinary" 
statutes and "constitutional" statutes. The two categories must be distinguished on 
a principled basis. In my opinion a constitutional statute is one which (a) 
conditions the legal relationship between citizen and State in some general, 
overarching manner, or (b) enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now 
regard as fundamental constitutional rights.72  
 
The Scotland Act 199873 meets these criteria and is explicitly listed as an example of such 
an Act. Laws LJ continues: 
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Ordinary statutes may be impliedly repealed. Constitutional statutes may not. For 
the repeal of a constitutional Act… the court would apply this test: is it shown that 
the legislature's actual – not imputed, constructive or presumed – intention was to 
effect the repeal or abrogation? I think the test could only be met by express words 
in the later statute, or by words so specific that the inference of an actual 
determination to effect the result contended for was irresistible. The ordinary rule 
of implied repeal does not satisfy this test. Accordingly, it has no application to 
constitutional statutes.74 
 
This highly controversial claim has received a mixed reception from academics and in 
subsequent judgments, although Lord Laws regards it as a “benign development.”75 Even 
TRS Allan, the committed common law constitutionalist, has expressed serious doubts 
over the concept: 
 
…Sir John Laws’s talk of ‘constitutional statutes’ imposes rather too much rigidity 
on [the common law’s] interpretative process capable of responding to all the 
relevant circumstances. It may be hard to know, in the abstract, whether or not a 
particular statute qualifies for such special status; and the question is likely to 
distract us from more nuanced matters of construction, tailored to the facts of the 
case in view.76 
 
It contradicts Dicey’s claim that “fundamental or so-called constitutional laws are under 
our constitution changed by the same body and in the same manner as other laws’.77 
Barendt agrees with Dicey that “fundamental laws ... can be as easily repealed as, say, the 
Animals Act 1971 or the Estate Agents Act 1979.”78 Laws LJ’s is not, however, an entirely 
novel concept. In Earl of Antrim’s Petition (House of Lords)79 Lord Wilbeforce said he felt 
“some reluctance to holding that a Act of such constitutional significance as the Union 
with Ireland Act is subfject to the doctrine of implied repeal.”80 Craig has argued that post-
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Factortame, judges increasingly perceive the idea of nullifying legislation unrelated to the 
European Union as “less novel or revolutionary.”81  
 
More recently in obiter remarks in H,82 Lord Hope effectively endorsed the Thoburn 
approach without mentioning it explicitly. He held that only an express provision could 
alter the 1998 Act due to 
 
… the fundamental constitutional nature of the settlement that was achieved by the 
Scotland Act. This in itself must be held to render it incapable of being altered 
otherwise than by an express enactment. Its provisions cannot be regarded as 
vulnerable to alteration by implication from some other enactment in which an 
intention to alter the Scotland Act is not set forth expressly on the face of the 
statute.83 
 
In fact, Lord Hope goes somewhat further than Laws LJ. Lord Hope’s ruled that the 1998 
Act cannot be impliedly repealed is absolute and unqualified, whereas Laws provided for 
some situations in which such a repeal may take place.  
 
Again in The HS2 Case84 Lords Neuberger and Mance said that 
 
The United Kingdom has no written constitution, but we have a number of 
constitutional instruments. They include Magna Carta, the Petition of Right 1628, 
the Bill of Rights and (in Scotland) the Claim of Rights Act 1689, the Act of 
Settlement 1701 and the Act of Union 1707. The European Communities Act 1972, 
the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 may now be 
added to this list. The common law itself also recognises certain principles as 
fundamental to the rule of law. It is, putting the point at its lowest, certainly 
arguable (and it is for United Kingdom law and courts to determine) that there may 
be fundamental principles, whether contained in other constitutional instruments or 
recognised at common law, of which Parliament when it enacted the European 
Communities Act 1972 did not either contemplate or authorise the abrogation.85  
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This expands on the Thoburn approach in that it creates a hierarchy of constitutional 
provisions. It implies that there exist constitutional provisions more fundamental than 
others. Yet this still applies only to implied repeal and there is no indication that it would 
apply to express appeal. 
 
Thoburn and Laws LJ’s extra-judicial arguments are interpreted by Elliot as an attempt to 
affect change in the rule of recognition.86  It is the beginning of a dialogue between Hart’s 
“officials” as to the true status of the rule of recognition. Courts are "attempting a peaceful 
revolution by incremental steps aimed at dismantling the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty and replacing it with a new constitutional framework in which parliament 
shares ultimate authority with the courts."87 Laws LJ is effectively staking out a position 
and seeking to build a consensus around it. There is no evidence that Parliament or the 
government have accepted the concept of constitutional statutes. Neither has it, for 
example, suggested or passed legislation with reference to it as constitutional in nature. 
The judiciary are increasingly willing to accept the rhetorical construct contained in 
Thoburn without applying it. This can be explained by an amended version of Allison 
Young’s dialogic model, in which the judiciary, the legislature and the executive engage in 
public dialogue with each other regarding constitutional fundamentals and individual rights 
protections.88 It would appear that this attempt at renegotiating the rule of recognition 
continues but with limited success.89 Goldsworthy warns that “[b]y unsettling what has for 
centuries been regarded as settled, the courts would risk conflict with the other branches of 
government that might dangerously destabilize the legal system.”90. 
 
The position is clearly fluid. H and HS2 show that the approach has been subsumed into 
the judicial lexicon, but that the constitutional statute scheme is insufficiently 
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2.3.1 The Source of Legislative Supremacy and Common Law Constitutionalism 
 
These questions, ostensibly technical ones of statutory interpretation, must be set in the 
context of what Turpin and Tomkins describe as the challenge of “common law 
radicalism.”91 Several judges and academics have sought to ground the basis of legislative 
supremacy in the common law.92 Lord Steyn believes legislative supremacy to be a 
“common law construct” flowing from the rule of law and that legislative supremacy is 
“out of place in the modern United Kingdom”;93 Sedley LJ claimed that the UK has “a bi-
polar sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament and the Crown in its courts, to each of which 
the Crown’s ministers are answerable – politically to Parliament, legally to the courts”;94 
and Laws LJ thinks that “[i]n its present state of evolution, the British system may be said 
to stand at an intermediate stage between parliamentary supremacy and constitutional 
supremacy…”95 Jowell is skeptical of the treatment that Dicey generally receives from 
academics, stating that  
 
[w]ith few exceptions, his [Dicey’s] conferment of prior status to parliamentary 
sovereignty over the rule of law has been parroted over the years as if were an 
eternal truth, and has always been honoured in practice.”96  
 
Even as Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith stated the government’s belief that “the source 
of the legislative powers [of Westminster] is the common law.”97 
 
By positioning legislative supremacy as a product of the courts this theory necessarily 
allow courts to amend or overturn the doctrine unilaterally. For Lord Irvine, such “extra-
judicial romanticism” is unwelcome and naïve.98 In any event, TRS Allan posits legislative 
                                                             
91 British Government and the Constitution n.56, 86. 
92 For critiques of the concept see Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart 2005) Ch 1; JAG 
Griffiths `The Brave New World of Sir John Laws' (2000) 63 MLR 159 and `The Common Law and the 
Political Constitution' (2001) 117 LQR 42; Thomas Poole `Dogmatic Liberalism? T.R.S. Allan and the 
Common Law Constitution' (2002) 65 MLR 463 and ‘Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of 
Common Law Constitutionalism’ [2003] OJLS Vol. 23, 3, 435-454. 
93 Jackson, supra. 
94 Stephen Sedley, ‘Human Rights: A Twenty-First Century Agenda’ [1995] P.L. 386, 389. 
95 International Transport Roght GmbH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 
158; [2002] 3 WLR 344 para 71. 
96 Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty under the New Constitutional Hypothesis’, 2006 P.L. 562, 564. 
Support for the position can also be found in Ian Ward, The English Constitution: Myths and Realities (Hart 
2004) 24-40. 
97 HL Deb 31 March 20014, vol. 2 col. WA 160.  
98 Lord Irvine, ‘Judges and Decision-Makers: The Theory and Practice of Wednesbury Review’ (1996) P.L. 
59, 75-78. 
22 
supremacy to be a product of “deeper principles”, primarily of democracy and the rule of 
law. Much of the purported evidence for this position can be found in a handful of 
anomalous seventeenth century decisions largely decided by Sir Edward Coke.99 Allan is 
unambiguous in his claim that the source of legislative supremacy must be found 
externally from Parliament as the institution could not have conferred power on itself. 
Instead, in his view, “Parliament is sovereign because the judges acknowledge its legal and 
political supremacy.”100  
 
Advocates of this position have been emboldened by the decisions in the Factortame 
cases,101 although Tomkins has demonstrated that, in deciding cases under the auspices of 
the European Communities Act 1972 the courts are acting at the request of Parliament in 
these cases and, therefore, there are no implications for the doctrine of legislative 
supremacy outside the boundaries of Community law.102 
 
In his landmark books on legislative supremacy, Jeffrey Goldsworthy refutes the claims of 
the common law constitutionalists and demonstrates that Dicey’s historical survey was 
fundamentally correct. As to the source of Westminster’s legislative supremacy, 
Goldsworthy demonstrates that its theoretical roots lie in the writings of a series of English 
political and legal writers from the thirteenth century onwards. He identifies the obvious 
flaw in Allan’s position, namely that “[t]he only alternative consistent with the argument is 
to think judges conferred authority on themselves.”103 
 
He goes on to show that the doctrine gained institutional acceptance is in the political 
settlement of the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Similarly, Tomkins 
describes the judicial recognition of the “political reality” of Parliament’s victory in the 
English civil war.104 This historical approach is in line with the advice of JAG Griffith, 
who described many constitutional approaches as being the result of conflicts105, and JDB 
Mitchell, who said that 
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Constitutions and constitutional doctrines are the result of history … [N]o theory 
about the sovereignty of Parliament can be proved, in the way that other legal 
concepts can be, by a chain of elucidatory decisions.106 
 
It can be seen, therefore, that the rule of recognition that the Queen in Parliament is 
supreme is conferred by consensus. When the doctrine of legislative supremacy is viewed 
as a product of a political consensus it is clear that is contingent upon that consensus 
remaining intact, as discussed above. The contemporary position is summed up by 
Goldsworthy when he says that: 
 
for many centuries there has been a sufficient consensus among all three branches 
of government in Britain to make the sovereignty of Parliament a rule of 
recognition in H. L. A. Hart’s sense, which the judges by themselves did not create 
and cannot unilaterally change.107 
 
2.4 Historical Sovereignty 
 
It will not have gone unnoticed that Dicey referred to the English rather than the British 
constitution. Whilst the two were widely conflated at the time, he was also implying that 
the historical position of legislative supremacy is different in Scotland and England.108  
That the Scottish constitutional order prior to the Union had no recognition of the concept 
of legislative supremacy is a common position and will now be evaluated. 
 
Scotland’s pre-union constitution was neither firmly settled nor clear. The relationship 
between Crown, Parliament and the people was subject to change depending on the 
personalities of the relevant constitutional actors and the broader political, social, military 







                                                             
106 Mitchell, Constitutional Law n.13, 63. 
107 History and Philosophy, n.27 234. 
108 Bradley and Ewing, Constitutional and Administrative Law n.5, 34-35 and 53. 
24 
2.4.1The Pre-Union Scots Parliament 
 
The Scots Parliament109 was a complex and dynamic institution. It was formed as an 
extension of the King’s Council in the thirteenth century. Although a unicameral 
legislature, it was divided into three estates along the broader “Estates of the Realm” 
principles of middle ages Europe.110 Central to understanding the Parliament was the 
operation of the Lords of the Articles. This acted as a pre-legislative committee, generally 
dominated by the King, but officially elected by the Estates. It is the strength of this 
institution as well as the Conventions of Estates upon which Dicey and Raitt maintained 
that the Scots Parliament was not sovereign.111 However, the Parliament dissolved the 
Lords of Articles in 1690 and did not summon a Convention of Estates after this. The Scots 
Parliament then passed the Act of Union 1706, extinguishing itself and Scottish 
sovereignty. This was done with no recourse to the people, who were thought to be 
opposed to the creation of a union with England and the abolition of the Scots Parliament.  
 
If “the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means no more nor less than… the right to 
make or unmake any law whatever and, further that no person or body is recognised by the 
law… as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament”112 then the 
pre-union-post-revolution Scots Parliament can be regarded in retrospect as an increasingly 
sovereign Parliament by the time of Union. The Scots Parliament dissolved itself and 
sacrificed Scotland’s sovereignty after unilaterally negotiating the limits of the Crown 
succession. No practical limitation had been recorded on the legislative power of the post-
Revolution Scots Parliament.113 In addition to this the principle of desuetude, the 
disapplication of laws of the Scots Parliament based on “a very considerable period, not 
merely of neglect, but of contrary usage of such a character as practically to infer such 
completely established habit of the community as to set up a counter-law or establish a 
quasi-repeal'114, has been pointed to as evidence of popular sovereignty acting as a check 
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on the Scottish Parliament’s sovereignty. This has been held up as an example of a 
limitation on the Scots Parliament’s powers.115 It is better regarded as an example of 
occasions in which the Scots Parliament failed to appreciate the political limits on its 
power and part of the negotiation of its authority. It is the very definition of an external 
limitation on parliamentary sovereignty as described by Dicey. In any event, it is 
universally acknowledged to have ceased to apply to post-Union legislation.116 
 
Moreover, the Scots Parliament acted as the highest court of appeal117, and other courts, 
which were therefore inferior to the Parliament, could not invalidate its acts.118 Laws made 
by the Estates were “said to oblige all the lieges of the realm.”119 A Scottish Commissioner 
in the negotiations surrounding the union said “the sovereign and representatives are the 
only judges of everything which does contribute to the happiness of the body politic, and 
from whom no appeal can legally be made… Our law is positive, that this Supreme Court 
is subject to no human authority.”120 
 
The doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty had not been articulated fully by 1707.121 The 
Scots Parliament did not get the opportunity to develop into an explicitly sovereign 
legislature, or in another direction, as it extinguished itself in the process of Union. 
However, there is sufficient evidence that it was heading in the direction of legislative 
supremacy. 
 
2.4.2 The Claim of Right 1689 and George Buchanan 
 
The Scots Parliament’s precise constitutional status was never formally settled. This is 
largely because the Scottish constitutional order was in a constant state of flux in the 
seventeenth century and the theoretical framework had not yet been established .122 In 
1689 the Parliament adopted the Claim of Right, the terms upon which William and Mary 
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were to accept the Scottish Crown.123 The Claim is based on George Buchanan’s sixteenth 
century exposition of a social contractrarian relationship between the monarchy and the 
people. 124 
 
Neil MacCormick has proposed an interpretation of the Scottish constitution which places 
popular sovereignty at its fulcrum, based on his reading of Buchanan.125 Buchanan evinced 
an interpretation of Scottish political thought that vested in the Scottish people the 
authority to overthrow despotic rulers. His argument was that, as Scotland had never been 
conquered by a foreign invader, its people had never been dominated by force. The 
authority of the Crown was, therefore, contingent on the people’s consent. As MacCormick 
himself interpreted it: 
 
The old Scottish constitution, as Scots authorities like George Buchanan were very 
insistent, was never a constitution based on conquest. Hence the Ius Regni, the law 
of the kingdom, could never be interpreted as constituting an absolute monarchy, 
but only as authorizing a limited one dependent on popular assent. From this, and 
from such other iconic texts as the Declaration of Arbroath and his interpretation 
of the ancient constitution, has derived the thesis that in Scottish constitutional 
tradition, sovereignty belonged to the people, to the community of the realm, rather 
than to Parliament, or, strictly King or Queen in Parliament.126  
 
MacCormick’s romanticised interpretation of Buchanan is problematic.127 Buchanan’s 
writing is not a purely descriptive account of the contemporary Scottish constitution. 
Instead, it is his selective interpretation of Scottish history combined with his political 
theory.128 He is asserting political oughts rather than legal realities.129 Buchanan 
“constructed an ancient constitutional history of Scotland, relying on a theory of popular 
sovereignty in which the ‘people’ meant an assembly of the nobles and clan chiefs…”130 
His “the people” was radically different to modern conceptions. Buchanan viewed the 
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supposed election of monarchs after the deposition or assassination of tyrannical rulers by 
“leading men – primores – of the nation”.131 Such behaviour in modernity would be 
regarded as a coup d’état rather than the expression of popular sovereignty. This is 
understandable, as Buchanan was writing at a point in history before democracy as we 
would recognise it had crystalized, but it serves to demonstrate the next problem.132 
 
The primary problem with MacCormick’s interpretation of Buchanan and the pre-union 
Scottish constitution is that it attempts to impose modern, or at least more recent, concepts 
on the past.133 Buchanan relied upon the Declaration of Arbroath of 1320 and his 
interpretation of the supposed ancient Scottish constitution as a basis for a proto-popular 
sovereignty movement within the Scottish constitution. The Declaration is best known for 
its anti-English conquest peroration,134 but its primary purpose was to request that the Pope 
at Avignon recognise Robert the Bruce as king of Scotland and the rights of the Scottish 
people to select their own form of government. It seeks to safeguard the Scottish people’s 
independence from England and implies that, in Scotland, the monarch’s power is derived 
from the people. This is used by Buchanan to demonstrate a somewhat limited Scottish 
monarchy whose power derives from the consent of the people.  
 
The Declaration is far from unique as a medieval document seeking to limit the monarch’s 
powers. Magna Carta, signed a century prior to the Declaration, has very similar rhetoric to 
the Declaration. It contains near universal protections for Englishmen, and sought to limit 
the power of the King. It is difficult to maintain that the Declaration represents a uniquely 
Scottish approach to the relationship between the Crown and the people. 
 
Moreover, this position views the constitutional position of the Scottish monarchs as static. 
The subsequent behaviour of the Scottish monarchs did not always indicate that they felt 
particularly limited by popular sovereignty, with the revival of the Divine Right theory 
under the Stuarts the most notable example of this.135 
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Arguments surrounding sovereignty developed to a point recognisable to modern lawyers 
through the eighteenth century.136 Prior to that discussions surrounding sovereignty were 
highly theoretical or descriptive of struggles between different branches of the state, 
generally the Crown, Courts, Parliament and the Kirk. This relationship ebbed and flowed 
in the pre-union Scottish constitution, but a general trend towards increasing power 
towards parliament and away from the crown, culminating in the 1689 revolution, is 
discernable. From this point until the union itself the Scottish Parliament rapidly gained 
power and prominence in Scotland, and exhibited a sort of “proto-sovereignty”.137  
 
The “very rapid growth” of the Scots Parliament’s significance in the constitutional order 
from the 1688 to 1707 “is often overlooked.”138 Although many of the factors in the 
removal of King James were religious and unrelated to the constitutional status of 
Parliament, Parliament ousted the monarch in 1689, not the people. In doing so the Scots 
Parliament started in a direction very similar to its English counterpart, that of a formally 
supreme legislature.139 
 
It can be observed, therefore, that the growth of the Scots Parliament’s sovereignty, whilst 
uneven, was evident. The people did not figure in these events. Scottish constitutional 
practice at the time was focused on tensions between the courts, landowners and 
Parliament, and popular sovereignty was of little relevance.  
 
It may be the case that a tradition of popular sovereignty as we would recognise it would 
have developed in an independent Scotland alongside the French and American 
conceptions in the seventeenth century. This is unknowable, as Scotland, heavily 
influenced by English political and constitutional thought and practice, increasingly 
adhered – and contributed – to the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty as it developed in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. What is clear is that the vast majority of the 
Scottish people were not regarded as forming ‘the people’ in seventeenth century Scotland. 
Legitimate use of “popular” sovereignty was the exclusive jurisdiction of the nobility and 
land owning elites.  
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Seventeenth century Scotland was a “half-baked medieval mixed constitution which, 
consisting only of aristocratic and monarchic elements, was, unlike England’s, incapable 
of generating or protecting the liberty and property of the commons.”140 When Scotland 
entered into the union the precise nature of its constitution had not been fully declared; its 
part in the “Parliamentary revolution” is clear.141 
 
2.4.3 Post-Union Scotland 
 
Post-union Scottish constitutional development is generally similar to that of the English 
constitution, or at least running parallel with it. There were issues of distinction but the 
general trend is of convergence.142 This is a function of the increasingly unitary, centralist 
nature of the British political and constitutional order at the time. As Parliament sought to 
consolidate its power gained in the aftermath of the removal of King James and the 
subsequent Acts and Treaty of Union, it developed an absolutist position in the British 
constitutional order. Jacobite uprisings, which may have been budding movements based 
on popular sovereignty, in the decades following the union were quelled.143 The people are 
almost entirely absent from this period, with the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty 
developing through the work of Blackstone and then Dicey, consolidating legislative and 
Crown power in the legislature and executive. Scottish public law, partially as a 
consequence of the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords acting as its Supreme Court 
on civil matters, developed in step with that of England. A number of questions have been 
raised on the relevance of legislative supremacy to Scotland in the period leading up to the 
1998 Act. They will be discussed here. 
 
2.4.4 The Acts and Treaty of Union 
 
The Acts and Treaty of Union are the products of the interests of the English and Scottish 
establishments. The protection of the Scottish legal, education and religious systems 
emphasises their privileged status within pre-Union Scotland. The Acts and Treaty make 
no reference, however, to sovereignty or supremacy. They provide no mechanism for their 
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judicial enforcement. For this reason, the assertion at the end of the Treaty that it applies 
“for all time coming” is an attempt at political, rather than legal entrenchment and, in any 
event, was a common term of statutory construction in Acts of the Scots Parliament.144 It is 
not, contrary to the claims of some145, a quasi-constitution for the United Kingdom. The 
union predates the late eighteenth century establishment of written constitutions,146and 
“even those who regarded these provisions as legally unalterable did not believe that they 
were judicially enforceable…”147 Indeed, no case has successfully secured the invalidation 
of an Act of Parliament based on a breach of the terms of the Act of Union.148  
 
In any event several provisions of the Act of Union have been breached and the argument 
that it is in any way an encumbrance on the doctrine of legislative supremacy is now 
largely esoteric. Similarly abstruse is the debate regarding the position of the Church of 
Scotland. Although “most members and ministers”149 of the Church of Scotland believe 
Section one of the Church of Scotland Act 1921 entrenches the Church’s independence 
from judicial and Parliamentary interference, Parliament retains the legal authority to 
legislate on such matters. As Dicey and Raitt claim 
 
A sovereign Parliament, in short, though it cannot be logically bound to abstain 
from changing any given law, may, by the fact that an Act when it was passed had 
been declared to be unchangeable, receive a warning that it cannot be changed 
without grave danger to the Constitution of the country.150 
 
In this sense, the 1921 Act is, in effect, morally and politically entrenched.151 The revision 
of its essential provisions is unlikely due to the constitutional and political ramifications of 
such a course of action. It is an example of the external limitations on legislative 
supremacy. It is also an example of the tremendous degree of political accommodation that 
Scottish institutions have experienced as part of the Union, even in terms of legislative 
supremacy, rather than a substantive limitation on the doctrine. 
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2.4.5 MacCormick and the (not-so) Distinctly English Principle 
 
Few cases from the Court of Session can be as quoted as MacCormick v Lord Advocate152. 
A somewhat vexatious claim regarding Queen Elizabeth’s right to style herself “the 
Second” under the Royal Title Act 1953 in Scotland led Lord President Cooper to make his 
seminal remarks as to the relevancy of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty to 
Scotland. For Cooper, “the principle of the unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a 
distinctly English principle which has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional law.”153 He 
developed this point further: 
 
…considering that the union legislation extinguished the Parliaments of Scotland 
and of England and replaced them with a new parliament, I have difficulty in 
seeing why it should have been supposed that the new Parliament of Great Britain 
must inherit all the peculiar characteristics of the English Parliament but none of 
the Scottish Parliament as if all that happened in 1707 was that ... Scottish 
representatives were admitted to the Parliament of England. That is not what was 
done. 
 
...the Treaty and associated legislation ... contain some clauses which expressly 
reserve powers of subsequent modification; and other clauses which either contain 
no such power, or emphatically exclude subsequent alteration by declaration that 
the provision shall be fundamental and unalterable in all times coming ... I have 
never been able to understand how it is possible to reconcile with elementary 
canons of [statutory] construction, the adoption by the English constitutional 
theorists of the same attitude to these markedly different types of provision.154 
 
There is an ostensible irony of a political unionist who stood for Parliament for the 
Unionist Party stating this, but Scottish legal nationalism has no necessary connection with 
political nationalism.155  
 
Although obiter and in a case that failed on both the pursuer’s lack of title and interest and 
the court’s lack of competence on the matter, Lord President Cooper’s intervention has 
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been the source of a great deal of comment over the years.156 A surprising amount of it has 
missed the point that Cooper’s obiter remarks are part of a far broader project initiated by 
him and TB Smith.157 The “Cooper-Smith”158 ideology insisted that the Scottish civil legal 
tradition had been subjected to the unwelcome and “rarely if ever… for the good”159 
influence of various English institutions, most importantly Parliament and the Judicial 
Committee of the House of Lords. The unchecked influence of this “alien source” was 
“unwholesome” for Scots law.160  
 
Lord President Cooper’s remarks, therefore, are not a dispassionate and impartial 
assessment of objective fact; they are a political and partial reading of a history expressing 
a legal nationalist position. This does not necessarily render them inaccurate. Nonetheless, 
or perhaps because of this, they have been the source of great tension. 
 
In Gibson v Lord Advocate161 Lord Keith left open the appropriate judicial response to 
Westminster abolishing the Court of Session or Church of Scotland. In Stewart v Henry162 
a Sheriff relied on Lords Cooper and Keith to assert that there is no constitutional bar to 
judicial investigation of whether legislation complied with certain articles of the Act of 
Union. In Pringle Petitioner163 Lords Hope and Weir explicitly reserved their judgment as 
to whether the Court of Session could use the Act of Union to challenge a Westminster 
Act.  
 
The primary problem with Lord President Cooper’s assertion and the confused cases 
mentioned above, is that they fail to recognise the significance of the existing consensus 
amongst officials in Scotland and at UK level that Westminster is in fact legally supreme.  
Furthermore, Lord President Cooper selectively reads Scottish history. As we have seen, 
the post-reformation Scots Parliament never had the opportunity to establish its 
sovereignty, to fall back under the domination of the Crown or acquiesce to the purported 
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“sovereignty of the people”. The Scots Parliament’s status was still developing at the time 
of the Union, as discussed above. 
 
The post-Union developments show little evidence of Scottish disquiet at the growing 
consensus of legislative supremacy. This consensus grew in line with the accommodating 
approach towards Scotland adopted by Westminster. Its current status is at the heart of this 
work, but the depiction of legislative supremacy as a foreign import in Scotland is 




The applicability of the doctrine of legislative supremacy to Scotland is a longstanding 
issue. The claims are largely unfounded, but they persist. Legislative supremacy has been 
the operating rule of recognition in Scotland and the UK for three centuries. 
 
The attempts by several judges and academics to undermine legislative supremacy is a 
profound and fundamental challenge to the doctrine. It is tenuous and muddled, but 
appears increasingly assertive. We can “now set aside common law constitutionalism. In 
truth, most constitutional scholars and judges accept that the foundation of legal authority, 
including Parliament's sovereignty, is not a common law rule but rather what Sir William 
Wade called a “political fact” “ultimate rule of recognition.”164 
Whether Parliament possesses the capacity to legally bind its successors is a vexed 
question. If, as Griffith notoriously remarked, the constitution is ‘what happens’,165 then, 
there is potential for a new position to be adopted. 
 
In an early work, TRS Allan rejects the absolutist interpretation of this issue, like the one 
proposed in Ellis, as it will “…overlook the elasticity inherent in the simple idea that what 
the Queen in Parliament enacts will be recognised by the courts as law.”166 He continues: 
 
The point at which the courts have stepped sufficiently beyond the traditional limits 
of statutory construction, imposing more ambitious restraints on legislation, as to 
justify use of the term 'revolution' is surely a matter of taste. It certainly defines no 
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point of special legal significance—the legal order has, perhaps, been modified one 
more degree, but it is the same legal order. To insist that, at some magic moment, 
the old legal order passes away and a new one comes into being is to insist on an 
arbitrary division and to hinder the natural process.167 
 
Allan argues that different perspectives on sovereignty are possible depending on the 
consensus that has developed on the particular issue being decided. For example, a manner 
and form requirement could be enacted in relation to legislation regarding Community law 
but nothing else depending on the consensus. 
 
In this vein, the constitutional status of the 1998 Act could be different from other 
enactments often considered to be “constitutional” in nature, such as the European 
Communities Act 1972 or the Human Rights Act 1998. The Scottish political settlement, 
centred as it is on the democratically elected Scottish Parliament, granted strong support in 
a referendum and its perpetuation representing the consensus view of officials in Scotland 
and the rest of the UK, may be more difficult to disrupt than the more contentious 
incorporation of human rights into domestic law, for example. The manner and form of 
legislation relating to the Scottish constitutional settlement could be treated distinctly by 
Parliament and the courts without necessarily spilling over into other areas of law. But it is 
clear that there is little appetite for the adoption of such a position. The utilisation of a 
technical form of formal entrenchment is not proposed by any political party.  
 
Parliamentary sovereignty remains “…under the British Constitution, the sun around 
which the planets revolve.”168 It is the central rule of recognition in the Scottish and British 
constitutional orders. 
Hart, Wade and Goldsworthy correctly identify the empirical nature of the process of 
establishing the precise status of legislative supremacy at any given point. They all accept 
the potential for alterations to the rule of recognition short of revolution. The context for 
such a potential change in Scotland will be explored in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 3: From Home Rule to the Scottish Parliament  
 
Home Rule, and the related concept of devolution, has been a key part of mainstream 
Scottish political discourse for over a century.169 Home Rule was a central issue in the 
United Kingdom prior to the outbreak of the First World War, and was frequently raised in 
the interwar period by reformers. No government was willing to abrogate its own power in 
this way. Further, during the Second World War talk of Home Rule was regarded as at best 
a distraction from the war effort.170 
 
As Mullen has noted, since its formation, however, there has continuously been “a 
distinctly Scottish political space and a distinctly Scottish system of governance within the 
Union.”171 The position of Secretary of State for Scotland, abolished in 1747, was re-
established in 1885 as a de facto cabinet attending position, with full cabinet status 
awarded in 1892.172 The Scottish Office originally controlled law and order and education 
along with assorted other matters, but the department gradually took a larger role in 
governing Scotland173, with the department having to be divided into several sub-
departments and moved to Edinburgh in 1939.174 This administrative devolution was the 
institutionalised acknowledgement of the distinctive nature of Scottish politics and 
society.175 
 
The post-war consensus centred on strong central planning, with Whitehall acting on 
instruction of Parliament widely perceived as the best method of securing both socialist 
and conservative goals for the two major parties respectively.176 With Labour and the 
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Conservatives dominating elections from the 1940s until the late 1970s177 devolution 
remained a subject of mainly esoteric concern even in Scotland with sporadic and fleeting 
outbursts of intense interest. The Scottish Covenanting Association, for example, could 
only sustain itself for two years, from 1949 to 1951, despite attracting two million 
signatures for its declaration.178 
 
The Scottish National Party, founded in 1934, saw several MPs elected since the 1945 
General Election, but it is widely regarded as making its major breakthrough in the 1967 
Hamilton by election.179 This followed Plaid Cymru's victory in the Carmarthen by-
election a year earlier and, alongside general disquiet with the degeneration of the post-war 
consensus, placed devolution at the forefront of the political agenda. 
 
In response to this, Conservative leader Ted Heath committed his party to devolution in his 
so-called “Declaration of Perth” in 1968.180 Prime Minister Harold Wilsom commissioned 
a report into devolution, and a Royal Commission on the Constitution, instituted in 1969 
and chaired by Lord Kilbrandon181 reported in 1973.182 The Kilbrandon Report 
recommended that a Scottish Assembly be formed, with relatively broad powers, although 
its constitutional status would be explicitly inferior to Westminster. 
 
The SNP’s emergence as a significant political force in the late 1960s was intensified by 
the discovery of large deposits of oil in the North Sea.183 This added a new credibility to 
Scottish independence, which encouraged unionist parties to take the discussion of 
devolution more seriously.  
 
Thus the Labour party introduced legislation providing for a Scottish Assembly based 
broadly on the Kilbrandon recommendations, which required a post-legislative referendum 
to approve the Assembly.184 During its difficult passage through Parliament an MP for an 
English constituency (but originally from Scotland) introduced a requirement for 40% of 
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the Scottish population to vote in favour of devolution for the referendum to succeed.185 In 
the 1979 referendum, the Scottish people narrowly voted in favour of the Assembly, but 
failed to muster enough votes to meet the 40% requirement set by the so-called wrecking 
amendment.186 The 1978 Act was consequently repealed and the Assembly was not 
formed. 
 
Margaret Thatcher was bound to publicly support the principle of devolution prior to the 
referendum by Heath’s 1968 speech, although her party opposed the precise form of home 
rule proposed in 1979. She immediately abandoned the commitment to devolution upon 
becoming Prime Minister.187 
 
3.1 The Campaign for a Scottish Assembly  
 
By the end of 1979 “it seemed that devolution… was well and truly off the table.”188 The 
Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (CSA), however, was formed by pro-devolution 
academics and political activists in 1980 to “keep the torch [of devolution] alight.”189 
 
The campaign engaged with political parties and civic groups, although they maintained an 
“arm’s length approach” to the organisation.190 The CSA commissioned opinion polls, 
printed leaflets, held conventions and protests and sought public support for a Scottish 
Assembly. Its work garnered increasing support amongst MPs and local councillors, but it 
had little effect until the 1987 election, where the Conservative party received less than 1 
in 4 votes in Scotland but still comfortably controlled the government – the so-called 
doomsday scenario.191 In response to this the CSA formed a steering committee to draw up 
plans for a Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC), tasked with increasing and 
mobilising support for the CSA’s project. 
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The CSA’s aim was to unite the opponents of the constitutional status quo around a 
consensus vision of Scotland’s constitutional future. In this vein the steering committee 
prepared a Claim of Right for Scotland. 
 
3.1.1 A Claim of Right 
 
A Claim of Right asserted that the people of Scotland were responding to 
“misgovernment”, deliberately echoing the writers of the previous Claims of Right for 
Scotland in 1689 and 1842.192 This “misgovernment” was immanent to British 
constitutional arrangements, not merely the decisions of a particular government: 
“Symptoms are mistaken for causes, which lie in the way Scotland is governed.”193 It was 
the Westminster system itself and its tendency toward centralisation that was the cause, 
and the Thatcher government’s policies an extreme symptom.  
 
The Claim explained that 76% of Scottish voters voted for parties in favour of home rule in 
1987, but there was “no possibility” of it being enacted.194 This was fundamentally 
undemocratic, unjust, and compounded by the fact that the Scottish people had voted in 
favour of devolution in the 1979 referendum, according to the Claim.195 
 
The Claim derided the “English constitutional tradition” as “fraudulent[t]”, “fragil[e]” and 
alien to Scotland. 196 The Claim asserted that, in distinction, the Scottish constitutional 
tradition is founded upon the sovereignty of the people, not of parliament.197 The British 
majoritarian tradition founded on parliamentary sovereignty no longer accommodated 
distinctive approaches in Scotland because Scotland can vote for parties radically opposed 
to the governing party’s policies and the British constitutional status quo but, because of 
that constitution, to no avail. The Claim stated that: 
 
Scotland faces a crisis of identity and survival. It is now being governed without 
consent and subject to the declared intention of having imposed upon it a radical 
change of outlook and behaviour pattern which it shows no sign of wanting… The 
crucial questions are power and consent; making power accountable and setting 
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limits to what can be done without general consent… [which] will not be 
adequately answered in the United Kingdom until the concentration of power 
masquerading as the Crown-in-Parliament’ has been broken up… Scotland, if it is 
to remain Scotland, can no longer live with such a constitution and has nothing to 
hope from it.198 
 
The British constitution could not accommodate Scottish claims for self-government on its 
own because it privileged Westminster’s sovereignty over the Scottish people’s, and 
therefore the Scottish people “must create their own machinery [of constitutional 
change].”199 A Scottish Parliament was needed to ensure that Scotland’s distinct legal, 
political and social systems could be governed democratically and fairly. To achieve 
consensus on this, a Constitutional Convention was required:  
 
Repeatedly down the years a great volume of Scottish opinion has been expressed 
in favour of an elected assembly… An assembly still has not been achieved, and 
this is the clearest evidence that Scottish opinion cannot be effectively registered in 
the British Parliament… A political climate has to be created in which a Scottish 
Assembly becomes inevitable whichever party is in power. We see a Constitutional 
Convention as means of so registering Scottish opinion as to make an assembly 
inevitable and to ensure that the assembly created is an effective one…200  
 
3.1.2 The Scottish Constitutional Convention  
 
Constitutional conventions are bodies ‘chosen for the purpose of considering and either 
adopting or proposing a new constitution or changes in an existing constitution.201 They 
“fill a democratic gap when the government of an existing state has partly or wholly 
failed.”202 The source of its legitimacy is usually disputed by those it challenges as it is not 
an emanation of the state and cannot, therefore, derive its legitimacy from the democratic 
mandate afforded to governments.203 
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There have been several failed constitutional conventions in Scotland in the past century, 
but the SCC of the late 1980s and early 1990s is uniquely significant.204 
 
The purpose of the SCC was to act as a bridge between the CSA and Scotland’s political 
parties and civic institutions, and prepare a blueprint for devolution. To this end a report by 
a “representative group of people who are not enslaved to the political parties but who 
carry political weight” was needed.205 The Convention was to also mobilise Scottish 
opinion and eventually work with a future government to secure a Scottish Parliament.  
 
The SCC emphasised a consensus-based approach to its work, both as a measure to ensure 
that all parties involved bought in to the arrangements and as a point of distinction from 
the Westminster majoritarian style of government epitomised by the Thatcher 
government.206 In this sense, it saw itself as more consistent with the typical understanding 
of the Scottish constitutional tradition. The SCC saw as central the need to convince the 
Scottish people that the specific policy problems they may have with the government 
where symptoms of a general constitutional problem. 
 
The Convention held plenary sessions, took evidence and prepared several reports. Its first 
meeting was attended by 55 Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs for Scottish constituencies, 
7 MEPs, representatives of each regional authority, all island councils and most district 
councils, the STUC, churches, business and industry organisations, Gaelic and ethnic 
minority representatives, and representatives of the Universities. Absent were SNP and 
Conservative MPs.  
 
Its first act was to create a declaration, confusingly also called A Claim of Right for 
Scotland. This Claim acknowledged “the sovereign right of the Scottish people to 
determine the form of Government best suited to their needs.”207 This pledge was signed 
by all who took part in the Convention and was aimed at “root[ing] the Convention solidly 
in the historical and historic Scottish constitutional principle that power is limited, should 
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be dispersed, and is derived from the people.”208 This claim was heavily influenced by 
Lord Cooper’s infamous obiter statement in MacCormick.209  
That Labour MPs and unionist politicians signed such a nationalistic declaration was 
“crossing the Rubicon.”210 It was a declaration founded on “two pillars – the historic claim 
[of the sovereignty of the people]… and the contemporary sense of outrage at the way 
Scotland was being treated.”211 
 
The SCC established several working groups on practical matters relating to devolution. It 
had no legal identity, no agendas and no votes. On St Andrew’s Day 1990, it published 
Towards Scotland’s Parliament, which reasserted much of what the original claim had 
argued for. It represented “civil Scotland contriving to oppose her [Thatcher] government’s 
very right to govern north of the border.”212 It stated that “the people of Scotland want and 
deserve democracy”, which was denied by “present constitutional circumstances.”213 It 
then outlined in broad terms the provisions suggested for a Scottish Parliament, elected by 
proportional representation, with wide-ranging powers on virtually all matters bar 
macroeconomic policy, defence and foreign affairs and with an emphasis on limited power 
exercised through consensus.  
 
The report was rushed out in expectation of a Labour victory in the 1992 election.214 When 
this did not materialise, the SCC committed itself to forcing the devolution issue with both 
further reports215 and through increased campaign activity.216 
 
In 1995 the SCC published Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right which produced a far 
more detailed “blueprint”217 for the Parliament, including provisions for its voting system 
and committee structure. 
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After the death of Labour leader John Smith, who due to successive elections in which the 
vast majority of the Scottish people had voted for parties in favour of home rule, had 
accepted devolution as the “settled will of the Scottish people”218 which did not require a 
referendum to enact it, Tony Blair changed Labour policy and set a pre-legislative 
plebiscite on the question of whether there should be a Scottish Parliament and whether it 
should have limited tax-varying powers.219 This was a political move, aimed at minimising 
the accusation that Labour would be a “tax and spend” government220, and a tactical one, 
using a referendum result as a method of silencing the complaints of English MPs in the 
North of England who resented increased powers for Scotland.221 
 
The referendum resulted in an overwhelming vote in favour of the creation of a Scottish 
Parliament and a strong vote in favour of it possessing tax varying powers.222 In response 
to the result Blair said “Well done. This is a good day for Scotland, and a good day for 
Britain and the United Kingdom…the era of big centralised government is over!”223  
 
3.2 Legitimacy  
 
Legitimacy is at the heart of the devolution argument, tending to manifest itself both in a 
negative sense (contesting the legitimacy of the Westminster system of government itself 
in Scotland) and a positive one (asserting the legitimacy of the SCC). 
 
The concept of legitimacy is “far from straightforward, and is much contested in political 
science.” 224  Legitimacy may mean that “that a regime or institution has moral authority 
according to agreed rules” or it may be “equate[d] with public and elite support.”225 
David Beetham has argued that power should be “acquired and exercised according to 
justifiable rules”, and that legitimacy is intimately connected to this. 226  He contends that 
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legitimacy is defined by various groups in different ways, e.g. lawyers think in strictly 
legalistic terms, social scientists regard public support as the defining characteristic of 
legitimacy.  
This rationalist approach can be contrasted with the empirical methodology derived from 
Weber.227 This requires measurable legitimation to come from above, below and 
horizontally, with superior bodies, the subjects of the body’s power (generally the public) 
and equivalent institutions recognizing a body’s legitimacy.  Beetham describes this as 
“the belief in legitimacy” that occurs where “those involved in them, subordinate as well as 
dominant, believe them to be [legitimate].’228  
 
Habermas further divides this into perceived and moral legitimacy.229 Perceived legitimacy 
occurs when an organization is viewed as legitimate, but his description of legitimacy 
requires us to go “beyond perception alone”.230 He states that if: 
 
…every effective belief in legitimacy is assumed to have an immanent relation  to 
truth, the grounds on which it is explicitly based contain a rational validity claim 
that can be tested and criticized independently of the psychological effects of these 
claims.231 
 
Whilst moral legitimacy is partially a function of perceptions of legitimacy, “it is 
something qualitatively different from the latter, since it hinges on more than just 
contingent, subjective reasons…”232 
 
Utilizing a slightly different process of classification, Russell refers to what various 
political scientists have described as ‘input’, ‘output’ and ‘throughput’, or ‘source’, 
‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ legitimacy.”233 
 
Input, or source, legitimacy refers to the methods by which members of an institution are 
selected. The simplest method by which input legitimacy may be derived is by electing the 
members of the body, the idea being a rudimentary democratic one, that the people, having 
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selected the membership of that body, transfer their will to it until the next opportunity 
they have to elect members, where the process and legitimacy are renewed. 
 
However, in some circumstances, when a body is not democratically elected it may derive 
legitimacy from alternative sources. Russell identifies “policy expertise and independence 
from the party political process” as other potential sources of input legitimacy.234 The use 
of such groups is prevalent in any democracy. Majone identifies an “important issue for 
democratic theory” as “specify[ing] which tasks may be legitimately delegated to 
institutions insulated from the democratic process...”235 
 
Output legitimacy is derived from the positions taken by the body. In effect, if the public 
assess that they support the output of an institution they deem it legitimate; if they 
consistently do not support its policy positions, eventually they will find it to be 
illegitimate. The public may disagree with individual decisions of institutions, but retain 
overall support for their authority to make decisions in what can be described as “diffuse 
support”.236 This is the sort of backing provided to courts in democratic states. According 
to Russell, output legitimacy “may to some extent compensate for a lack of democratic 
input legitimacy.”237 Russell quotes Steffek as saying that there may “be other reasons than 
democratic participation and control for people feeling that they should accept rules and 
decisions of governance…”238 
 
Finally, throughput legitimacy relates to the body’s decision making process and 
adherence to procedural propriety.  This form of legitimacy, again, traditionally applies to 
courts and is closely related to output legitimacy.239 The supposedly neutral status of 
accepted procedures imbues the body in question with a sense of fairness.  
 
3.2.1 Legitimacy and the 1980s devolution debate  
 
This relatively abstract discussion of legitimacy lay at the heart of the devolution debate. 
The general perception of successive Conservative governments’ lack of legitimacy in 
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Scotland was the aggravating factor for the devolution debate in the 1980s and what made 
it different to the preceding century of calls for home rule.  
 
3.2.2 Legitimacy and the Poll Tax240 
 
In 1983 the scheduled revaluation of Scottish local government rates was postponed in 
order to allow debate on their future. The Conservatives had opposed the way these rates 
were calculated since 1974.241 When the revaluation was eventually scheduled to be 
carried out it was described by the press as promising increases of four or five times the 
prior figure.242 This led a small group of businesses and wealthy people to stridently lobby 
the government to abandon the increases, adopting a “quasi-nationalist” approach that 
emphasised that English businesses were not being re-evaluated for several years.243  
 
This became a major issue for conservative supporting businesses and party members. In 
response, the government proposed a flat-rate tax as a solution to the problem.244  The 
legislation to introduce the Community Charge or Poll Tax was rushed through parliament, 
minimising and largely ignoring concerns expressed by Scottish MPs , local government 
and Scottish civic opinion.245 The legislation only passed with English MPs’ votes.246 The 
poll tax was introduced a year earlier in Scotland than in England.  
 
It was a disastrous policy. 2.5 million summary warrants were issued for non-payment of 
the tax over three years and tens of thousands of people fell off the electoral register to 
avoid the tax.247 It was challenged by judicial review248, marches, petitions and protests 
were organised throughout Scotland, but the Scottish approach of civil non-payment and 
protest proved fruitless whilst riots and civil disobedience in England led to the tax’s 
demise.249 It was eventually repealed UK wide and replaced by the Council Tax.250 
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The poll tax was seminal in the devolution debate. It typified the myriad frustrations and 
doubts held by many Scottish people about the way that Scotland was treated within the 
British political system. It was “a bad tax brought in by a minority party with minimal 
support beyond its own ranks” in Scotland.251 It was derided as “undemocratic, unjust, 
socially divisive and destructive of community and family life” by representatives of 
Scotland’s three largest churches. 252 It has acquired totemic status in Scottish political 
debate. 
 
The tax’s introduction a year earlier than in England invited the accusation that Scotland 
was being used as a guinea pig for British legislation and exacerbated the sense of 
grievance.  
 
Of the poll tax, a Claim of Right noted that:  
 
Probably no legislation at once so fundamental and so lacking in public support 
would have been initiated other than in a territory within which the Government 
was unrepresentative of and out of touch with the electorate.253 
 
The lack of popular support for the Conservatives in Scotland was the essence of the 
problem: “Scotland was… being governed by a Conservative government in London, 
elected not only by a minority of the United Kingdom vote, but unrepresentative of the will 
of the Scottish electors.”254 The Labour Party adhered to largely parliamentary methods of 
challenging the legislation, but this proved futile. This reiterated the central thesis of the 
devolutionists, that the Westminster system not only was not delivering for Scotland, that it 
could not do so.  
 
The Poll Tax represents the ultimate point of atrophy for the conservative government’s 
democratic legitimacy in Scotland. It radicalised many politically minded people in 
Scotland in a constitutional sense255, and provided a constitutional context for political 
problems: “The law did not become invalid as a result of its ineffectiveness; rather, the 
ineffectiveness created a political reason as to why the law should be repealed.”256 
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Opposition to the poll tax became aligned with the case for a [Scottish] parliament. The 
perception grew in Scotland that the Conservative government, with limited support north 
of the border, was imposing policies on Scotland - which the poll tax symbolized.  
 
Widespread non-payment of the poll tax can be seen as a rejection of the government’s 
legitimacy. The tax even helped radicalise hitherto relatively conservative constitutional 
campaigners like Donald Dewar.257 The tax became regarded as symbolic of the Thatcher 
government’s “…abuse of parliamentary sovereignty and therefore a violation of the 
unwritten norms of the constitution.”258 The illegitimacy flowing from the poll tax, 
therefore, created a vacuum in which the SCC could seek legitimacy.259 
 
3.2.3 The SCC and the Government 
 
The Conservatives were profoundly hostile to the SCC and its aims.260 Thatcher referred to 
the SCC as “not a cross section” of Scottish society, consisting of “self-selected people 
who already hold a particular view.”261 A prominent Conservative MP called the potential 
Scottish Parliament a “secure Socialist power base from which to challenge 
Westminster”,262with another calling the SCC “the Labour Party at prayer”263. A 
government spokesman at the time dismissed the Claim of Right as “mumbo jumbo”264, 
and the British government refused to recognize the SCC as a representative body of the 
Scottish people. More generally, a motion supporting the principle of devolution was voted 
down 300-11 at the 1988 Scottish Conservative Conference,265 whilst a report advocating 
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“take it or leave it unionism” which proposed the “full assimilation of Scotland… within 
the overall framework of Conservative politics…” was welcomed by the government.266 
The doctrinaire position adopted by the Thatcher government was that the British 
constitution furnished only them with legitimacy to speak for the Scottish people.267 It 
failed to recognise the potential for constitutional accommodation for Scotland short of an 
ultimate right to secede from the Union. Thatcher herself said: 
 
As a nation, they [the Scottish people] have the undoubted right to national self-
determination… Thus far they have exercised that right by joining and remaining 
in the Union... What the Scots (nor indeed the English) cannot do, however, is insist 
upon their own terms for remaining in the Union, regardless of the views of others. 
If the rest of the UK does not favour devolved government, then the Scottish nation 
may seek to persuade the rest of us of its virtues… but it cannot claim devolution as 
a right of nationhood inside the Union.268 
 
The SCC extended the logic inherent to the idea of Scottish self-determination regarding 
remaining with the Union to devolution. It posited that the Union was a compact between 
its constituent nations and that this permitted distinct constitutional traditions to remain 
from the pre-Union era and continue to develop. 
 
Scottish popular sovereignty, supposedly a foundational principle of the Scottish 
constitutional order, was being denied by the structure of the British state in breach of this 
compact, and that revision of the British constitution was necessary to adapt to it, 
unilaterally if necessary.269 A Claim of Right asserted that “the Scots are a minority which 
cannot ever feel secure under a constitution which, in effect, renders the treaty of union a 
contradiction in terms.”270 
 
The two sides did not engage in arguments on the same terms. The Conservative 
government saw their actions as inherently legitimate as they possessed a UK-wide 
parliamentary majority; they perceived the UK as a single demos, a unitary state.271 
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Advocates of devolution regarded Scotland as a distinct demos within a Union state, with 
legitimacy in Scotland requiring widespread political support in Scotland.  
 
Their differences were even more profound than this. The SCC’s critique of majoritarian 
British political culture and philosophy was an implicit – and often explicit – criticism of 
parliamentary sovereignty.272 The SCC’s competing conceptualisation of legitimacy was of 
the sovereignty of the people. This was summed up by the SCC’s chair, Canon Kenyon 
Wright, in his celebrated question and answer that: “What happens when that other voice 
we know so well [Mrs Thatcher] says, ‘We say No, and We are the State.’ Well, We say 
Yes and We are the People!”273  
 
This “…conjunction of the two arguments – union state and popular sovereignty…”274 lay 
at the heart of the campaign for devolution. It is the constitutional tradition in Scotland 
being “refurbished and pressed into new use.”275  
 
3.2.4 The SCC’s Legitimacy  
 
With only 17% of the population aware of the SCC at a relatively advanced stage in its 
deliberations a question may be asked of how truly representative an organisation it could 
seriously claim to be. 276  It could be argued that the low level of public awareness and 
engagement with the SCC and CSA277 lent some credence to the Thatcher interpretation of 
it as little more than a pressure group. Some saw it as an “anti-establishment 
establishment”278, frustrated that it could not wield power.279 
 
The contrary argument is that the SCC gained indirect legitimacy from the broad 
participation of a wide range of elected MPs, MEPs and councillors, and became a “truly 
representative” convention imbued with an inherent legitimacy.280 They were elected on 
devolutionary platforms, and most then elected again after joining the SCC. Further, the 
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technical expertise and status in society of many of the participants as well as its 
consensual, ‘round table’ approach to policy formulation adds further legitimacy to the 
SCC.281  
 
Moreover, opinion polls regularly reported support for the SCC’s cause and output, if not 
the SCC itself.282 This is output legitimacy, and the SCC’s approach – consensus-focused 
and participatory – confirms its throughput legitimacy as well.283 In sum, the SCC, in spite 
of the absence of direct elections for its members, was a legitimate organisation. The 
traditional methods of demanding change within the structures of the British constitution 
had been exhausted, with not only a succession of elections recording overwhelming 
support for devolutionary parties being ignored, but a referendum vote in favour of 
devolution frustrated by a technicality in 1979. An extra-parliamentary project was 
necessary. The large majority who voted in favour of the devolution plan set out in the 
government’s white paper284, which was “…firmly based on the agreement reached in the 
Scottish Constitutional Convention”285, acts as a post-hoc validation of the SCC’s 
legitimacy.  
 
The SCC was not the only method by which the Scottish people were actively rejecting the 
legitimacy of the Thatcher government in Scotland, and this demonstrates the broader 
movement for change that the SCC was part of. The poll tax non-payment movement 
constituted a serious rejection of legitimacy. It was organized and broad-based. The 
American Revolution was sparked by a rebellion against the duties imposed on the 
American Colonies by the Tea Act 1773, with mass participation fermented by the slogan 
“No taxation without representation”. The American colonists had no Members of 
Parliament at all and is therefore not an identical comparator, but the act of imposing an 
unpopular tax where there was defective representation in the context of questionable 
legitimacy is similar. Non-payment is in some ways similar to the infamous “Boston Tea 
Party”: a political act of defiance against a power perceived to be illegitimate.  
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The SCC was part of this broader movement denying the legitimacy of the Conservative 
government in Scotland. It sought to connect the grievance aimed at the specific policies of 
the Conservative government with the constitutional context that created the grievances. 
 
3.3 The Scotland Act 1998 
The 1998 Act received Royal Assent on 19 November 1998. Due to the overwhelming 
nature of the 1997 Referendum result and the Labour Party’s large majority in the House 
of Commons, the Scotland Bill was comfortably passed. It is “on any view, a monumental 
piece of legislation.”286 The 1998 Act as amended provides inter alia for a Scottish 
Parliament287, a Scottish Government288, tax-varying powers for the Scottish Parliament289 
and its legislative competence290. The Parliament’s legislative competence is broad, with 
any power not explicitly reserved in Schedule 5 presumed to be devolved.291 This is the so-
called ‘retaining model’ of devolution.292 The powers devolved and the procedures of the 
Scottish Parliament are indistinguishable from those proposed by the SCC. 
One major distinction with the SCC’s proposals is the absence of formal entrenchment of 
the Scottish Parliament. On the contrary, during the 1998 Act’s passage through 
Parliament, Donald Dewar said: "We accept that sovereignty within a devolved system lies 
with the United Kingdom Parliament."293 Tony Blair asserted that sovereignty would 
remain with him “as an English MP at Westminster.” 294Section 28 (7) of the 1998 Act 
states that “This section does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
to make laws for Scotland.” This is an unusual clause. It is not usually necessary for 
Westminster to assert its sovereignty. It is, in many regards, a statement made from a 
position of weakness. The then Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, Michael Ancram, 
described it as a “half-hearted reassertion” of parliamentary sovereignty.295 
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The Government of Wales Act 1998 does not have a comparable provision.296 More 
recently, Section 18 of the European Communities Act 2011 also asserted Parliament’s 
sovereignty, on this occasion over law emanating from the European Union.  
One corollary of Section 28 (7) is the so-called Sewel Convention. This constitutional 
convention precludes Westminster from legislating on devolved issues without the consent 
of the Scottish Parliament, expressed in legislative consent motions.297 As Lord Sewel 
explained in the House of Lords during the Scotland Act’s passage through Parliament: 
 
Clause 27 makes it clear that the devolution of legislative competence to the 
Scottish parliament does not affect the ability of Westminster to legislate for 
Scotland even in relation to devolved matters. Indeed, as paragraph 4.4 of the 
White Paper explained, we envisage that there could be instances where it would 
be more convenient for legislation on devolved matters to be passed by the United 
Kingdom Parliament. However … we would expect a convention to be established 
that Westminster would not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters in 
Scotland without the consent of the Scottish parliament.298 
 
This sensitive and consensual approach to legislating has largely been adhered to. It is the 
constitutional expression of the political fact that whilst “the UK Parliament, as a 
sovereign body, retains full legal power to legislate on devolved matters… the spirit of 
devolution implies that political power rests with the Scottish Parliament.”299 
The 1998 Act has been significantly amended by the Scotland Act 2012 and will be again 
by the legislation following the Smith Commission Report.300 
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Using the theoretical terms outlined above, the SCC questioned the Thatcher government’s 
input legitimacy, as it received only a relatively small minority of the vote and number of 
MPs in Scotland301; its output legitimacy, in that its policies – epitomized by the poll tax – 
were “…impose[d]”302 on Scotland and out of sync with Scottish traditions, public opinion 
and values303; and its throughput legitimacy, querying the relevance and distinctive nature 
of the Scottish Office, the Scottish Grand Committee, the majoritarian system employed at 
Westminster, and, ultimately, parliamentary sovereignty.304 In response, the Thatcher 
government denied the SCC’s input legitimacy due to its unelected status, but the SCC 
gained legitimacy from the elected status of many of its members, the technical expertise 
of others as well, broad public support for its output and the vacuum of legitimacy left by 
the government of the day’s lack of democratic mandate. 
 
The policies of the Conservative government of the time represented the final straw for 
Scotland’s long attenuating constitutional relationship with the rest of the UK. Generations 
of displeasure at what A Claim of Right called “misgovernment”305, epitomized by the poll 
tax, accumulated to develop the fertile ground for a constituent power to form in Scotland. 
The SCC’s calls for change were truly representative of what the Scottish people sought, as 
confirmed by the overwhelming support given to plans set out by the Blair government for 
devolution which were consciously very similar to the SCC’s proposals. The Convention 
acted as “the final, self-constituted expression of a voice which had no other agent to carry 
it”.306 
 
The Convention represented a: 
 
paradoxical linkage [between] a commitment to constitutional form… [and] a 
claim that the sub-state national society is constitutionally entitled to revive the 
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pluralized version of constituent power with which it and other national societies 
entered the union.307 
 
The SCC was a bold critique of the British constitutional status quo. It was a vehicle for 
latent calls for change but also an agent of it. The SCC constituted an autochtonous and 
vanguard response to the democratic deficit inherent within the existing British 
constitutional arrangements. The response of the major political parties to their proposals –
near complete acceptance of their plan from Labour, the Liberal Democrats, and, 
eventually, the SNP and Conservatives – demonstrates how the SCC acted as a structure 
through which the Scottish people altered the British constitutional settlement.308 
 
The 1998 Act transposed the political work of the SCC in to legal reality and largely 
adhered to the SCC’s model. How the courts reacted to this change will now be 
considered.  
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Chapter 4: The Courts’ Approach to Devolution: From Whaley to Imperial Tobacco 
 
The political shift outlined in the previous chapter has been brought before the Scottish and 
British courts. This chapter will examine the judicial accommodation to this political shift 
in the devolution jurisprudence of the Court of Session and the Supreme Court. 
 
The British courts have gradually adapted the level of accommodation they are willing to 
afford to the Scottish devolution scheme. On devolution it is clear that they have taken a 
journey in the fifteen years since the Scottish Parliament’s formation. Over this period the 
Court of Session, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords and, latterly, the Supreme 
Court have all demonstrated an increased willingness to recognise the significance of the 
democratic legitimacy of the Scottish Parliament.  
 
4.1 Early Cases 
 
In the first case concerning the Scottish Parliament’s legislative powers to come before the 
Court of Session, Whaley v Watson309, Lord President Rodger adopted a profoundly 
conservative approach to the Scottish Parliament’s constitutional status. The Lord 
President declared that  
 
the fundamental nature of the [Scottish] parliament as a body which – however 
important its role – has been created from statute and derives its power from 
statute… [The Scottish] Parliament, like any other body set up by law, is subject to 
the law and to the courts which exist to uphold that law. 310  
 
In doing so it  “join[ed] that wider family of parliaments [that] owe their existence and 
powers to statute and are in various ways subject to the law and to the courts which act to 
uphold the law.”311 In this decision the impact of the 1997 referendum and the 
Parliamentary status of the new institution was completely ignored. In a later case312 the 
Judicial Committee of the House of Lords refused to comment on whether Scottish 
Parliamentary legislation was primary or secondary in nature, again not acknowledging the 
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implications of the popular support expressed for the Parliament in the 1997 Referendum 
or of its capacity to produce primary legislation. 
  
In Adams v Scottish Ministers313 a few years later, the Inner House of the Court of Session 
adopted a very different approach. The Lord Justice Clerk’s judgment acknowledged the 
Scottish Parliament’s wide discretion and was deferential to it as a “sui generis” 
institution.314  In the same case in the Outer House315 Lord Nimmo Smith made more 
precise comments regarding the nature of the Scottish Parliament’s legislation. Lord 
Nimmo Smith described its Acts as having “far more in common with public general 
statutes of the United Kingdom Parliament than with subordinate legislation as it is more 
commonly understood.”316 This, he said, is because the Parliament is democratically 
elected, may amend Westminster legislation regarding Scottish devolved matters, and its 
Acts require Royal Assent. In the Inner House the Lord Justice Clerk approved of this 
thinking.317 Lord Nimmo Smith qualified the decision, however, by acknowledging that 
while the legislative process “distinguish[es] legislation so enacted from acts or 
instruments subject to judicial review on traditional grounds…” its “establishment did not 
involve the ceding to it of "sovereignty" (whatever precisely that may mean) even within 
its restricted statutory field of competence.”318 
 
These early decisions lack a coherent approach to the devolution settlement. The judiciary 
appear to be coming to terms with the Scottish Parliament in an ad hoc fashion. An 
element of judicial conservatism is apparent, with Scottish courts keen on at least keeping 
open the possibility of applying the broad supervisory jurisdiction of the Court of Session 




More recently, in Sinclair Collis Limited, Petitioners319 the Lord Ordinary noted that: 
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On the spectrum of decision-makers the Scottish Parliament occupies a place close 
to that of the national legislature. In my opinion an enactment of the Scottish 
Parliament should be accorded a margin of discretion similar to, and approaching, 
that which would have been accorded to the measure had it been enacted by 
Parliament at Westminster.320  
 
This more nuanced thinking was extended by the Axa decisions.321 In this case, concerning 
the Scottish Parliament’s decision to legislate to make asymptomatic asbestos-related 
illnesses actionable harms for the purposes of the law of delict, several insurers raised an 
action claiming that the legislation was outwith the legislative competence of the Scottish 
Parliament, as infringing certain Convention Rights and on common law grounds.322  
 
In both the Inner and Outer Houses of the Court of Session, it was held that the supervisory 
jurisdiction of the Scottish Parliament’s legislation on the established grounds of 
irrationality or illegality could be used only in extreme cases in which bad faith, improper 
motive or manifest absurdity is demonstrable.323  
 
This position was rejected in the Supreme Court, with Lord Hope relying on “the guiding 
principle… [of the] rule of law enforced by the courts” as “the ultimate controlling factor 
on which our constitution is based.”324 In applying this he held that Acts of the Scottish 
Parliament are subject to the Court of Session’s supervisory jurisdiction. 
 
However, Lords Hope and Reid qualified this principle with the support of the five English 
Justices who also sat on this case. Lord Hope acknowledged that, as the Scottish 
Parliament is rooted “in the traditions of universal democracy”, the courts should 
“intervene, if at all, only in the most exceptional circumstances.”325 This case took the 
Court in to “uncharted territory.”326 Lord Hope made clear that the Scotland Act is of “real 
constitutional importance”, implying that it is not a standard Act of Parliament.327  
In spite of this democratic imperative, he emphasised that “[t]he rule of law requires that 
the judges must retain the power to insist that legislation of that extreme kind is not law 
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which the courts will recognise.”328 He stressed, however, that the democratic mandate 
afforded to the Scottish Parliament renders instances in which this would occur 
exceptional: 
 
The Scottish Parliament takes its place under our constitutional arrangements as a 
self-standing democratically elected legislature. Its democratic mandate to make 
laws for the people of Scotland is beyond question. Acts that the Scottish 
Parliament enacts which are within its legislative competence enjoy, in that 
respect, the highest legal authority.329 
 
Similarly for Lord Reed, even though Parliament “legislated for a liberal democracy 
founded on particular constitutional principles and traditions” it cannot have “intended to 
establish a body which was free to abrogate fundamental rights or to violate the rule of 
law.”330 Lord Reed believes that the Scottish Parliament’s plenary law making powers 
mean that the “grounds of review developed in relation to administrative bodies which 
have been given limited powers for identifiable purposes … generally have no purchase” 
to Holyrood.331 
 
For both Lords Hope and Reed the type of legislation required to be struck down under 
these conditions is unlikely to occur. Importantly, Lord Hope’s general remarks concerning 
the Scottish Parliament apply equally to Westminster, ignoring the standard status granted 
to the United Kingdom Parliament as a sovereign legislature. The two Parliaments, Lord 
Hope asserts, share a democratic mandate and the value gained from the “width of 
experiences” of its members.332 They also share similar problems: 
 
We now have in Scotland a government which enjoys a large majority in the 
Scottish Parliament. Its party dominates the only chamber in that Parliament and 
the committees by which bills that are in progress are scrutinised. It is not entirely 
unthinkable that a government which has that power may seek to use it to abolish 
judicial review or to diminish the role of the courts in protecting the interests of the 
individual.333 
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Such issues raise conflicts between the rule of law and democratic imperatives. Lord Hope 
accepted that in this case there was no need to resolve that question or any tension between 
the rule of law and legislative supremacy, but he assumes that such a tension exists.334  
 
In Imperial Tobacco335 the Supreme Court sought to create a sense of comity and structure 
to the Scottish Parliament’s status in relation to Westminster. Here Lord Reed recognised 
that the Scottish Parliament must be able to “legislate effectively” within the “generous 
settlement of legislative authority” devolved to it “while ensuring that there were adequate 
safeguards for those matters that were intended to be reserved.”336 In the Inner House of 
the Court of Session, the Scotland Act, according to Lord Reed337 and quoted approvingly 
by Lord Brodie338, was described “not a constitution’, distancing themselves from Lord 
Hoffman’s judgment in Robinson, in which Lord Hoffman called the Northern Ireland Act 
1998 a “constitution for Northern Ireland”.339 
 
The case underlines that the Scottish Parliament’s Acts should be interpreted using the 
same principles as any Act of the UK Parliament.340 Lord Hope also noted that Parliament 
devolved power to the Scottish Parliament “while itself continuing as a sovereign 
legislature.”341 
 
Some cases regarding the Welsh Assembly have been less accommodating in their 
approach to devolution.342 Although, in spite of what Lord Hope noted in The Welsh 
Byelaws case343 “the essential nature of the legislatures that the devolution statutes have 
created in each case is the same”, the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly will not be 
treated in identical ways by the courts; the Scottish Parliament may be afforded greater 
judicial deference than the Welsh Assembly due to the increased political sensitivities 
relating to the more nationalistic Scotland. These cases can be seen as “clarifications” of 
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Robinson, a unique case in which a specific provision of an Act, in peculiar circumstances, 
contradicted the Act’s purpose.344  
 
4.1.2 Lord Hope’s Further Remarks  
 
Since deciding these cases Lord Hope has elaborated on these positions. He summarised 
his judgment in Axa in the following terms: 
 
The common law challenge [to the 2009 Act] was rejected on the ground that the 
mandate given to the Scottish Parliament by the electorate suggested that, while its 
legislation was not immune from judicial review, the judges should intervene, if at 
all, only in the most extreme circumstances. The opportunity was however taken to 
emphasize that the rule of law was the ultimate controlling factor, and that the 
Scottish Parliament was not free to abrogate fundamental rights.345 
 
Here, Lord Hope relies heavily on the referendum process as a tacit principle of respect for 
democracy as being fundamental in the Supreme Court’s approach to devolution. 
 
As to the conflict between the rule of law and legislative sovereignty, Lord Hope explicitly 
states that  
 
It is an uncomfortable fact that parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law are 
not entirely in harmony with each other. So long as Parliament respects the rule of 
law there is no problem. But to assert that Parliament can enact whatever laws it 
pleases runs the risk that the rule of law will be subordinated to the will of the 
government… My point in Jackson… is that the ultimate safeguard against such 
abuses of the legislative power of Parliament lies in the power of the judges… The 
absence of a general power to strike down legislation which it has enacted does not 
mean that the courts could never fashion a remedy for use in an exceptional 
case….346 
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In sum, the rule of law limits extreme behaviour by democratically elected legislatures, 
which must be enforced by unelected judges.347  
 
4.2 Human Rights Cases 
 
Even on the occasions where, under the Human Rights provisions expressly stipulated by 
the Scotland Act 1998, the Courts have struck down parts of the Scottish Parliament’s 
legislation they have done so in a measured and limited way. In Cameron v 
Cottam348and Salvesen v Riddell349 the Court of Session held that provisions of Scottish 
Parliamentary Acts are not law under the Scotland Act350 as they were in breach of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. The Supreme Court rejected the former decision and upheld the 
latter. The decisions related to relatively minor matters, not central planks of the Scottish 
government’s legislative programme. The remedy provided by the court was to remit the 
matter to parliament to cure the defects. “Decisions as to how the incompatibility is to be 
corrected… must be left to the Parliament guided by the Scottish Ministers.”351 
Moreover, it is a part of the Scotland Act 1998, and, thus, the constitutional settlement 
agreed to by the Scottish people, that Acts of the Scottish Parliament be subject to judicial 
review on grounds of incompatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. In 
these decisions the courts are applying the provisions of a Westminster statute with a 
sensitivity to the Scottish Parliament’s democratic nature.  
 
4.3 The accommodation of Devolution  
 
The distance from Lord President Rodger’s view, written in 2000, to these more recent 
cases is vast. The journey, however, has taken, in constitutional terms, a short time; in little 
over a decade the courts have gone from regarding the Scottish Parliament as another 
devolved body whose decisions require little to no deference and which possesses no 
special significance owing to its democratic legitimacy, to Holyrood occupying a unique 
position in the constitutional order. In the Axa and Imperial Tobacco decisions (although 
not in the majority decision in The Welsh Asbestos Case) the Scottish Parliament has gone 
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from legally indistinguishable from a local authority or quango to similar to the sovereign 
Westminster Parliament. A coherent jurisprudence is absent in the early stages of these 
cases. It is clear that there is no lengthy line of decisions - made in a similar vein to the 
Canadian Supreme Court in relation to unwritten principles - from the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom in relation to devolution. 
  
In recent years, the position has become even more complex and contradictory. The status 
of the Scottish Parliament in these cases must be seen in the context of the issues discussed 
in Jackson. Devolution is widely accepted to be one of the primary challenges to 
traditional notions of sovereignty, alongside the Human Rights Act 1998, European 
integration and globalization. In Jackson the Law Lords “assert[ed] the significance of 
their function within the UK constitution and refusing to admit that (in future cases) they 
are powerless to correct fundamental injustices.”352 
 
Significantly, the most recent Scottish judgments above rest on arguments regarding 
democratic legitimacy. In Axa Lord Hope repeatedly emphasised the strong democratic 
foundation of the Parliament. In Imperial Tobacco the court adopted a careful approach to 
the Scottish Parliament’s powers, again acknowledging its constitutionally unique status. 
The cases have not, however, explicitly acknowledged the role of the people in the Scottish 
constitution, with relatively conservative constitutional language being relied upon. Lord 
Hope has gone somewhat further in some of his post-judicial writing. As discussed earlier, 
in the seminal case of Jackson.353 Although the case did not directly address or relate to 
devolution, it did include some general and pointed remarks on the nature of parliamentary 
supremacy from the Law Lords. Axa affirms these principles and may be another step 
towards a more assertive judiciary in the face of Parliamentary and executive action. 
 
A complicating factor is the recent case of the Welsh Asbestos Case.354 In this case, the 
Supreme Court – in a majority decision and contra Lord Hope in Axa – found that 
“[p]erhaps in light of article 9 [of the Bill of Rights] there is a relevant distinction between 
cases concerning primary legislation by the United Kingdom Parliament and other 
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legislative and executive decisions.”355 This binary distinction places the Welsh Assembly 
alongside the Scottish Parliament, Northern Ireland Assembly, Local Authorities, and 
Ministers in distinction with the UK Parliament; the former is subjected to substantially 
less deference (if any) than the latter. The minority judgment written by Lord Thomas used 
language much more similar to Axa, granting “great weight to informed legislative 
choices” of all legislatures “particularly so where the judgment is made,,, on matters of 
social and economic policy.”356 Lord Thomas approvingly refers to the Axa approach.357 
He goes on to say that  
 
Under the devolution settlements, in areas where legislative competence has been 
devolved, the Assemblies and the Scottish Parliament, as the democratically elected 
bodies with primary legislative competence, have to exercise the same legislative 
choices as the United Kingdom Parliament would have to exercise in areas of 
legislative competence which it has not devolved.358 
 
Lord Thomas states that there is “no reason” why lesser weight should be granted to the 
devolved legislatures on devolved matters than the UK Parliament has on the same issues 
in England.359 
 
The two opinions are clearly at odds with each other in a fundamental sense; this is not a 
disagreement on a minor technical point or interpretation of facts. The decision was 
decided three to two, and, as it is clearly in conflict with Axa and Imperial Tobacco, it 
cannot be inferred from this single decision that the approach adopted there has been 
abandoned entirely by the Supreme Court. The case law is now, however, clearly in a state 
of flux. 
 
The Welsh Asbestos case notwithstanding, the central issue is that in Axa and Imperial 
Tobacco both the Court of Session and the Supreme Court rejected the idea that the 
defining characteristic of the Scottish Parliament is its devolved status. Instead, they 
focused on the democratic mandate afforded to the Parliament by the Scottish people. This 
is renewed in every election to the Scottish Parliament, but its founding act was in the 
overwhelming support afforded to it by the 1997 referendum. Thus, the significance of 
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popular sovereignty is implicitly recognized as a complicating factor in the modern view of 
legislative supremacy.  
 
However, the above-mentioned cases have not related to issues of grand constitutional 
significance or constitutional crises proper-so-called, being as they are actions raised by 
private companies or individuals. In the context of a dispute between the UK and Scottish 
governments, on the other hand, the court may have to resort to more constitutionally 
creative decision making in order to reflect the political reality of the Scottish 
constitutional order whilst maintaining the broad comity it has arrived at with Parliament.  
 
However, in Axa Lord Hope relies on the democratic mandate granted to the Scottish 
Parliament by the people for much of his decision. Could, therefore, the unilateral abolition 
of the Scottish Parliament act as a similar extraordinary catalyst for change to the Supreme 




With the principles established by the 1997 and 2014 Referendums and the emphasis 
placed upon the Scottish Parliament’s democratic mandate and origins, popular 
sovereignty could be formally assimilated into the Scottish constitution. This would be 
recognition of the existing Scottish political constitution. Any such action would clearly be 
“charting new constitutional waters” in the United Kingdom’s constitutional order.360 This 
could be achieved by acknowledging that principles of popular participation, devolution 
and mutual respect between the institutions at a Scottish and British level are “fundamental 
and organizing” principles of the Scottish constitution, much like in the Quebec Secession 
Reference.361  
 
Such a decision would have to be sensitively decided. It would perhaps be an error to go as 
far as Robinson v Secretary of State.362A more subtle approach was adopted by the High 
Court of Northern Ireland in Parson when it partially relied upon the support expressed in 
a referendum on the Belfast Agreement in endorsing the legality of a new scheme for 
police recruitment as the Referendum constituted a demonstration of the Northern Irish 
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people’s settled view.363 boldness of Robinson has been disapproved of in Imperial 
Tobacco364, but the nuanced approach to the constitutional implications of referendums 
utilized in Parson may be useful to the Scottish context; as . It is important to remember 
that devolution in the United Kingdom is asymmetrical and, as a consequence, the 
Northern Ireland Act could be a Constitution for Northern Ireland without the Scotland Act 
necessarily acting in a similar way in Scotland.   
 
The flaw in this approach, however, is that it is not for the courts to make such decisions. 
What constitutes fundamental and organizing principles of a constitution is a matter for the 
people utilizing their constituent power or expressed through their elected representatives.  
 
Whilst the courts have not gone this far, the fact that judges are entering into the even the 
early stages of this debate is part of a “quiet but profound revolution” of the Supreme 
Court’s role as necessitated by the boundary disputes inherent in the system of devolution 
adopted in the United Kingdom.365 
 
It should also be remembered that these decisions are simultaneously radical and 
conservative.366 They boldly seek to limit the excesses of legislative supremacy whilst also 
seeking to impose only “modest restrictions on legislative competence.”367 These cases, 
therefore, can only point to a certain direction of travel. Although the new Scotland Draft 
Clauses, which inserts into the Scotland Act an assertion that the Scottish Parliament is 
now a “permanent part of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements”, 368 likely to 
be law, there is no evidence that this legally entrenches the Scottish Parliament’s position 
in the British constitutional order. That is to say, there is little evidence that a British court 
will yet go as far as to strike down legislation expressly contradicting a constitutional 
statute.369 The Draft Clauses seek to amend the Scotland Act. If an Act of Parliament 
repealed the Scotland Act, then this assertion of permanence would be repealed at the same 
time. Legal entrenchment, therefore, cannot be achieved with legislative supremacy.  
                                                             
363 In the Matter of an Application by Mark Parson for Judicial Review [2001] NIQB 46 para 34; discussed 
in Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation (OUP 
2012) 148. 
364 N.75.  
365 Vernon Bogdanor, ‘Parliament and the Judiciary: The Problem of Accountability’, lecture to UK Public 
Administration Consortium, February 9, 2006 2. 
366 Mark Elliot, ‘Holyrood, Westminster and Judicial Review of Legislation’ C.L.J. 2012, 71(1), 9-11, 11 
367 Ibid. 
368 N.3, Clause 1. 
369 The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, A Constitutional Crossroads: Ways Forward for the United 
Kingdom, May 2015, 14. 
66 
 
The related question of the consequences and theoretical context of referendums has been a 
theme throughout this work. The next chapter will examine this issue.  
67 
Chapter 5: Referendums, Constitutional Moments and Constitutional Unsettlement 
 
The previous chapter discussed a potential avenue for resolving the issue in the courts. It 
was seen that this is undesirable on democratic and pragmatic grounds. This chapter will 
look at a political approach to resolving the issue. This chapter will firstly discuss 
referendums from a theoretical perspective before considering the 2014 Independence 
Referendum. It will then seek to frame the 1997 and 2014 Referendums within the concept 
of constitutional moments before discussing whether this has led to a new Scottish 
constitutional settlement. 
 
5.1 Constitutional Referendums 
 
It is important to distinguish between different types of referendums. It is constitutional 
referendums with which this work is concerned.  
 
Constitutional referendums are those ‘popular votes in which the question of partially or 
totally revising a State's Constitution…is asked.’370 Tierney further distinguishes between 
two types of constitutional referendum, namely those that are ‘constitution-changing’ and 
those that are ‘constitution-framing’.371 The former are internal to the existing 
constitutional order and run alongside the ordinary political process, whereas the latter are 
external and concerned with the creation of new states or new constitutions. 
 
Recourse to referendums has become much more common in the last few decades across 
the Western world. The reasons for this are various, with disaffection and mistrust of 
political elites the most significant.372 Although some local referendums were held in 
Scotland and parts of Wales concerning licensing laws373, the device of a referendum has 
not traditionally been widely used in the United Kingdom.374 The increased use of direct 
democracy in the UK is part of an ‘anxious questioning and search, sometimes desperate, 
for innovations to revive a seemingly outworn system.’375 It remains the case, however, 
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that referendums are used infrequently in the vast majority of democracies, including the 
United Kingdom.376  
 
There is little evidence that the increased use of referendums is part of a principled effort 
to insert the people into the British or Scottish constitutional orders. Instead, they appear to 
have been used in an ad hoc fashion, a pragmatic and sometimes cynical response to 
prevailing political conditions377: Harold Wilson was committed to a referendum on 
Britain’s membership of the European Community as a product of infighting on the topic 
within the Labour Party;378 the 1979 Referendums in Scotland and Wales resulted from 
Jim Callaghan’s parliamentary coalition with Scottish and Welsh Nationalists and fears of 
Scottish nationalism;379 the 1997 Referendums in Scotland were announced relatively late 
on in the devolution process, at least partially due to tactical considerations regarding 
Labour MPs from the North of England;380 and the 2011 AV Referendum was a function 
of a coalition agreement. This does not mean, however, that this increased utilization of 
referendums has no affect on constitutional principles.  
 
Sub-state referendums, with their claim to a ‘people’ beneath the level of the monistic 
national demos, challenge the one of the central claims of western constitutionalism, 
namely that constitutions ‘res[t] upon the consent whether expressed or tacit, 
of one constitutional people.’381 In the United Kingdom, it questions a singular 
understanding of a constitution, as, if you have more than one ‘people’, you can have more 
than one constitutional praxis. It is this sense that the UK is a union state, with potentially 
different views on constitutional fundamentals, such as parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
It is this tension that Habermas attempted to resolve with his theory of 
‘equiprimordiality.’382 This posits that democracy, which he uses as a shorthand for 
popular sovereignty, and the rule of law, which denotes constitutionalism, can co-exist as 
equals.383 Constitutional limitations on popular sovereignty should be designed to permit 
the people to have a democratic influence on them and, if necessary, amend or supplant 
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them. The most obvious mechanism for achieving this goal is the referendum. Habermas 
contends that, although the foundations of a constitution are inevitably ‘groundless 
discursive self-constitution’, it is the ‘future-orientated character, or openness, of the 
democratic constitution’ that offers the ability for constitutions to accommodate competing 
and contradictory claims.384 Habermas states that ‘whoever bases her judgment today on 
the normative expectation of complete inclusion and mutual recognition… must assume 
that she can find these standards by reasonably appropriating the constitution and its 
history of interpretation.’385 Lindahl finds this analysis unsatisfactory as it fails to explain 
the source of constitutional legitimacy.386  
 
In any event, subgroups, such as sub-state nationalists, may seek to renegotiate the terms of 
their inclusion in the polity, or create a co-sovereign in certain circumstances, namely of 
their ‘people.’ 
 
Tierney recognises that implicit in much of this is a false dichotomy between ‘assertions of 
political sovereignty [and] the positivist authority of the constitution.’387 Similarly, 
Bogdanor notes that “the referendum serves not to replace the machinery of representative 
government, but only to supplement it.’388 Mendelssohn and Parkin observed that 
referendums are ‘intricately intertwined with the institutions and agents of representative 
democracy.’389 Walker explains that referendums “suppl[y] an ad hoc mechanism to 
authorize constitutional change where the normal pathways are deemed to lack the 
requisite constitutional gravitas or are of disputed legitimacy” and are, therefore, 
complementary to representative democracy.390 
 
Sub-state nationalists often resort to referendums with at least putative constitutional 
authority. Tierney identifies a tendency for sub-state nationalists to operate both “inside 
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and outside… the constitution in ways that are both strategic and, at the same time, 
intended to be mutually reinforcing.’391  
 
In Scotland the nationalist movement largely operates from within the constitutional order; 
for example, the referendums in 1997 and 2014 were both from ‘inside’ the constitution in 
that they were products of Westminster legislation392 and, thus, received the imprimatur of 
parliamentary sovereignty. The Consultation Paper published by the Scottish Government, 
‘Your Scotland, Your Voice: A National Conversation’, states that  
 
Scottish Parliament legislation must conform to the provisions of the Scotland Act 
1998.…It is…legitimate for a referendum held under an Act of the Scottish 
Parliament to ask the people questions related to an extension of its powers insofar 
as this is within the framework of the Scotland Act.393 
 
The White Paper on Scottish independence goes even further by claiming that the process 
of becoming independent would occur within the constitution: 
 
Existing constitutional arrangements in Scotland will provide the basis for the 
transition to independent statehood, with additional powers transferred as soon as 
possible after the referendum, giving the Scottish Parliament the ability to declare 
independent statehood for Scotland in the name of the sovereign people of 
Scotland.394 
 
These are expositions of constitutional orthodoxy and present the referendum, and even 
Scotland seceding from the union, as acts that rest within the constitution. This is 
unsurprising. As the Scottish Parliament’s existence and constitutional status flows from 
the 1997 Referendum, it would have been contradictory for the Scottish Government to, on 
one hand, assert the significance of popular sovereignty for a future referendum whilst, on 
the other, rejecting it in a past one. 
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The essential question for this work is whether a referendum can entrench the Scottish 
Parliament. As we have seen, the classical orthodox claim would be that it can not. 
However, ‘once sub‐state constituent power is mobilized through a referendum, traditional 
understandings of the limits of constitutional control can be challenged’;395 the 
referendum’s relationship with popular sovereignty carries with it a normative force. 
 
The theoretical position outlined by Habermas can see practical manifestation in 
Scotland’s constitutional order. Referendums are ‘an instantiation of ‘today's people’ 
speaking in a self‐conscious way as constitutional author’ which can be ‘presented as a 
new constitutional moment that legitimizes the supersession of earlier self‐conscious – or 
imagined – expressions of the popular will.’396 
 
Direct democracy is not necessary in conflict with representative democracy. There is no 
need for the legitimacy that flows from referendums to exist out with an existing 
constitutional order. Instead, it may exist within it, providing added legitimacy to 
significant foundational change and granting permission to constitutional actors to enact 
further change. Whilst the referendum may expose the limits of and disturb the ordinary 
constitution, its power is ‘relational’ to it.397 
 
5.1.1 Popular Sovereignty  
 
Popular sovereignty is a simple concept to state, it is the idea that the people are the 
ultimate source of sovereignty in a state, but elusive to fully appreciate. It is normative and 
often forms the basis of legitimacy in a constitutional order. 
 
As Ivor Jennings put it, “t]he people cannot decide until someone decides who are the 
people”398, so we must first turn to what constitutes a people. In terms of geographical 
limitations, Tierney notes that “standard modern formulations” of the people are “assumed 
to map neatly onto the boundaries of the state.”399 Because a demos produces a state 
through a constitutional act, a state must possess that single demos by definition. However, 
in union states400 there are a number of pre-existing demoi that are unified in one state.401 
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There are multiple political identities in the UK. These interact in a variety of complex 
ways,402 but for the purposes of this work it is sufficient to note that overlapping Scottish 
and British peoples can exist simultaneously and be invoked and utilized at different points 
and for different purposes within the UK. 
 
Within a geographical class who are the people? In a less democratic age the people was 
limited to elites.403 As notions of democracy grew more inclusive, as did the classes of 
person included in conceptions of the people. The notorious provision of the American 
Constitution404 classifying slaves as equivalent to three-fifths of a non-slave was repealed, 
and now ethnicity, social class and gender are irrelevant to our conception of a people. 
 
What, then, is the meaning of sovereignty in this context? It is not the purpose of this to 
fully explore the theoretical, historical, philosophical and sociological aspects of the 
concept of sovereignty.405 It is sufficient for us to recognise the need for an ultimate 
authority by which the general behavior of the state is legitimized and the possibility that, 
in particular circumstances and instances, a method by which some decisions are 
specifically legitimized. Loughlin describes this as  ‘an expression of a political 
relationship between the people and the state’.406 It is traditionally regarded as indivisible, 
but a relatively recent challenge to this monistic conception emanates from so-called 
“plurinational states”407, such as the United Kingdom. This allows for divisible or perhaps 
shared sovereignty, expressed through multiple peoples within a single state who may 
possess overlapping and membership of these peoples. 
 
With this in mind, we must examine what meaning popular sovereignty has. Hobbes 
regarded the people as a product of the formulation of the state, which “ceases to perform 
any active political role” upon the birth of its creation408 Locke described the people as 
“one Body Politick”, formed by consent and subject to “…the determination of the 
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majority.” 409 The people here are thought of as active agents of formation and change in a 
constitutional order. The idea of the people as an agent of change can be explored through 
the models of the constituent and constituted powers. 
 
5.1.2 Constituent and Constituted Power 
 
The constituent power is that force “prior to everything… the source of everything… Its 
will is always legal; indeed, it is the law itself.”410 It “presupposes the existence of an 
entity which is the bearer of political unity and which, through an act of will, constitutes 
the office of government.”411 It creates government as a method of managing tensions 
between different parts of society. Generally, it creates a form of representative rather than 
direct democracy due to the former’s ability to mediate these tensions through organized 
politics, which becomes increasingly important in large, more complex societies.412 For 
Maistre, the people “are a sovereign which cannot exercise sovereignty.”413 Their 
sovereignty must, therefore, be “divided, constrained, and exercised through distinctive 
institutional forms.”414 The constituent power creates the constituted power, which is the 
formal power of a series of institutions within a legal hierarchy.415 The constituent power 
is, therefore, an active force of change of the constituted power. The constituted power 
may be the mechanism by which change formally occurs in order to save or supplement its 
own legitimacy and existence, or it may be supplanted by a new range of institutions and 
underlying philosophy.416 This relationship must be continually mediated or it may 
descend in to populism, which can be a threat to constitutional democracy.417 In either 
event, the impetus for change emanates from the constituent power. 
The people are an example of a constituent power. Their acceptance of a constituted 
power, generally implicit and inferred from their democratic interactions with the 
government, is universally accepted as the basis of constitutionalism and legitimacy. In 
most countries the moment that the constituent power formed the constituted power is 
obvious: the writing of a constitution, for example. In Scotland there is no such moment. 
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The Acts and Treaty of Union were drawn up and executed by Commissioners on behalf of 
the Scottish and English Parliaments. They are not perceived as being truly constitutional 
in nature.418 There is no moment at which it can be said the Scotland was formed and its 
institutions constituted; the Scottish people never self-consciously constituted themselves. 
Instead, the nation itself emerged gradually over time and its institutions developed in a 
piecemeal fashion. 
 
What can be said is that in Scotland the Parliaments at Westminster and Holyrood, local 
authorities, courts, the government and the monarch form the constituted power. Similarly, 
that the people form a constituent power, in that they can overthrow the constituted power 
and replace it with a new one of their choosing, is an uncontroversial proposition. The 
central thesis of this work is that the people must be asked to express their view on matters 
of constitutional significance using referendums in Scotland.419 This work will now go on 
to explore whether popular sovereignty has been assimilated into the Scottish constituted 
power through the mechanism of referendums. 
 
5.1.3 The 1997 Referendum 
 
The SCC saw no need for a referendum on devolution, regarding the people to have 
expressed their “settled will”420 in successive general elections.421 They also saw 
themselves as representative of the people. However, the fact that one was held is deeply 
significant in understanding the in the  modern Scottish Constitution. 
 
The referendums confirming the Scottish people’s support for a Scottish Parliament and its 
tax-varying power were won comfortably by the yes campaign.422 Prior to 1997, Scotland 
had only ever taken part in two referendums, one on Britain’s membership of the European 
Community and the other on the proposals for a Scottish Assembly in 1979. The latter was 
successful in gaining a majority of the votes but failed due to a wrecking amendment 
which required 40% of the overall Scottish population to vote in favour of an Assembly.423 
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The primary difference between the genesis of the referendums in 1979 and 1997 is that 
the former was the result of disagreement within the Labour Party,424 and the latter the 
realization of a popular demand from the Scottish people. As we saw, the SCC represented 
a vanguard movement which sought to renegotiate the terms of the Scottish constitutional 
settlement in the name of the Scottish people. The Convention’s demand was that a 
devolved parliament be introduced in order to satisfy the Scottish people’s call for a 
distinct domestic policy agenda which could not be provided by the existing constitutional 
arrangements. It predicated this on the absence of a democratic mandate for the 
government in Scotland, treating it as a distinct polity.  
 
The manner by which it sought to implement the radical changes to the Scottish 
constitution it desired was, paradoxically, conservative. The ordinary legislative process 
was utilized. This can be explained by the fact that the SCC did not view itself as a 
revolutionary force.425 To the contrary, it called for what it viewed as a return to the 
traditional conception of the Scottish constitution.  
 
By demanding that the constituted power of Westminster be used to meet the needs of the 
constituent power of the Scottish people the SCC demonstrated a fidelity to the established 
practices of the British constitution.  
 
Although it was not the government’s intention to do so, the 1997 referendum implicitly 
ratified the insinuation of the people in the constituted power of the Scottish constitution. It 
made clear that, contrary to the SCC’s claims, on major constitutional issues the people’s 
permission cannot be inferred from ordinary parliamentary elections, where other, more 
pressing issues tend to dominate. As Tierney has noted “…once sub-state constituent 
power is mobilised through a referendum, traditional understandings of the limits of 
constitutional control can be challenged.”426 Rios notes that “Constituent power is… a 
force that challenges juridical systems from the outside and that, even when 
institutionalised, might re-emerge at any moment to destabilise it.”427 This appears to have 
happened in Scotland.  
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5.1.4 The People’s Referendum 
 
After their landslide victory in the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary Election, the SNP sought to 
enact their manifesto commitment to hold a referendum on Scotland seceding from the 
United Kingdom.428 Some academic debate arose regarding the Scottish Parliament’s 
capacity to pass legislation on holding a referendum premised on a false distinction 
between advisory and binding referendums, but it was widely recognised that only 
Westminster could legislate for a referendum.  
 
In a strictly legal sense the British government, applying Diceyan principles, could have 
maintained that, as the constitution is reserved and a clear majority of Scottish MPs 
represent unionist parties, the election of a majority nationalist Parliament at Holyrood was 
irrelevant to the reserved matter of Scotland’s continued status as a member of the United 
Kingdom. They could have interpreted the election as an electoral mandate for the SNP’s 
policies on devolved issues and not a referendum. The Spanish government is currently 
engaged in this form of constitutional formalism with Catalonia, as the Spanish 
Constitution precludes sub-national referendums.429  
 
The British government chose to interpret the 2011 election as the expression of the 
people’s demand for an independence referendum, with Prime Minister David Cameron 
stating that "I will do everything, obviously, as British prime minister, to…  treat the 
Scottish people and the Scottish government with the respect they deserve.”430 He referred 
to the plebiscite as “the people’s referendum.”431 Negotiations between the Scottish and 
British governments resulted in the so-called Edinburgh Agreement.432  
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An Order in Council under Section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998 was approved by the Privy 
Council, temporarily amending Schedule 5 of the 1998 Act to permit the Scottish 
Parliament to legislate for a referendum.433 Consequently, The Scottish Independence 
Referendum Act 2013 and Scottish Referendum (Franchise) Act 2013 were passed by the 
Scottish Parliament, providing for a referendum on September 18 2014 asking the question 
‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’434 
 
With an extremely high turnout of 84%, 55% of those who voted chose to remain in the 
United Kingdom.435 In the aftermath of the referendum the British government set up the 
cross-party Smith Commission to propose new powers for the Scottish Parliament. Its 
conclusions rested on several pillars. One pillar was the bringing about of a “durable but 
responsive democratic constitutional settlement, which maintains Scotland’s place in the 
UK…”436 Specifically, it provided that “UK legislation will state that the Scottish 
Parliament and Scottish Government are permanent institutions.”437  
 
The 2014 Referendum represents the recognition of a shift in the status of the Scottish 
Parliament. As described above, the courts have increasingly recognized the importance of 
the democratic nature of the Scottish Parliament, its ‘sui generis’438 nature and, tacitly, the 
significance of the referendum that introduced the Parliament. The 2014 Referendum can 
be seen as a form of ‘constitutional moment’, in which this shift is crystallized.  
 
5.2 Constitutional Moments 
 
As the 2014 Referendum and the findings of the Smith Commission underline, the 
constitutional implications of referendums are vast. American constitutional lawyer Bruce 
Ackerman has developed a theory regarding ‘constitutional moments,’439 which, although 
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primarily concerning the American Constitution, may provide a useful framework to be 
applied, in a broad sense, to the British constitutional order.440  
 
Ackerman identifies several moments where the American Constitution was amended 
outside the ordinary Constitutional amendment procedure, which is specified by the 
Constitution itself and difficult to meet the requirements of.441 This theory is known as 
dualism. In it, Ackerman distinguishes ordinary from constitutional politics and ordinary 
from constitutional law.442 He posits that while the American Constitution has been 
formally altered dozens of times, there have only been three truly transformative 
‘constitutional moments’ in American history. These are “… a special kind of politics that 
involves the entire American people acting in their capacity as sovereign.”443 These three 
constitutional moments are the adoption of the Constitution and Bill or Rights, the post-
civil war Reconstruction era and the period surrounding Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. 
Ackerman evidences his theory by analyzing the approaches adopted by the American 
Founding Fathers.444  
 
Ackerman argues that there is a cyclical pattern in American history. Typically, the vast 
majority of people are broadly disengaged from higher-order politics and constitutional 
thinking. Those who seek to prioritise these fundamental questions are “regularly rebuffed 
in the polls in favour of politics-as-usual.”445 For a variety of reasons, this sometimes does 
not happen and a particular fundamental is put at the centre of the political debate. 
Ackerman argues that: 
 
Decisions by the People occur rarely, and under special constitutional conditions. 
Before gaining the authority to make supreme law in the name of the People, a 
movement’s political partisans must, first, convince an extraordinary number of 
their fellow citizens to take their proposed initiative with a seriousness that they do 
not normally accord to politics; second, they must allow their opponents a fair 
opportunity to organise their own forces; third, they must convince a majority of 
their fellow Americans to support their initiative as its merits are discussed, time 
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and again, in the deliberative for a provided for “higher lawmaking”. It is only 
then that a political movement earns the enhanced legitimacy the dualist 
Constitution accords to decisions made by the People.446 
 
Ordinary governmental decisions obviously occur far more frequently, but are 
circumscribed by the prior limitations imposed by the People:  
 
Once a reform movement survives its period of trial, the Constitution tries to assure 
that its initiatives have an enduring future in political life. Elected politicians will 
not be readily allowed to undermine the People’s solemn commitments through 
everyday legislation. If they wish to revise preexisting principles, they must return 
to the People and gain the deep, broad, and decisive popular support that earlier 
movements won during their own periods of institutional testing.447 
 
Ackerman identifies several phases in a movement that transforms its central issue into a 
constitutional moment. There is the signaling phase, in which the movement gains 
sufficient traction amongst the People that it becomes the central question in politics; this 
is followed by the proposal phase, where a solution is proposed; the triggering phase takes 
place where a political event intervenes that provides tentative support for the broad 
premises of the proposals from the people and “generates additional momentum for 
change”448; then the mobilized popular deliberation stage takes place, where the proposals 
are heavily scrutinized by the public as well as political and legal actors449; finally, if a 
movement survives this stage, it is legally codified by the Supreme Court, “supplying the 
cogent doctrinal principles that will guide normal politics for many years to come”450 and 
ratified by the other branches of government and constitutional order.451 
 
Ackerman moves this descriptive analysis to a normative one, arguing that it suits 
countries that suffer from ebbs and flows of political engagement, encouraging the People 
to engage with the most fundamental constitutional questions of the day and limiting the 
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ability of political and legal figures to circumvent the People’s fundamental principles.452 
In an implicit nod toward a Hartian Rule of Recognition, once all three branches of 
government accept (explicitly or tacitly) the limitations imposed upon them by the People, 
it is indubitably in existence.453 
 
The alterations to the Constitution may be in the shape of a formal Constitutional 
Amendment, or may be more nebulous limitations on constitutional and political behaviour 
imposed upon constitutional actors. 
 
Clearly this argument is highly specific to the American Constitution and political 
structures. To be sure, Ackerman makes no claim for universality and explicitly limits his 
analysis to the American Constitution. In fact, Ackerman regularly contrasts their approach 
to his fairly simplistic description of the British constitution, to him the exemplar of a 
constitutional order that leaves politicians, once elected, to carry out constitutional change 
with little input from the People, a condition that he describes as “democratic monism.”454 
But Ackerman’s analysis here is of the eighteenth and nineteenth century British 
constitution that Jefferson and the other Founding Fathers sought to deviate from. It is not 
a realistic analysis of the contemporary British constitutional order. 
 
This idea of dualistic constitutional change, where extra-legal factors can cause substantive 
constitutional alterations, is more broadly applicable than the specific arguments that 
Ackerman puts forward regarding the American Constitution. Ackerman’s contrast 
between ordinary and constitutional politics is illustrative of how most modern 
democracies appear to work and how most electorates engage with politics and 
constitutional change: 
 
… [W]e usually spend most of our time and effort in more private spheres of life. 
Normal politics is a sideline… 
 
But at other times, politics can take center stage with compelling force. The events 
catalyzing a rise in political consciousness have been as various as the country’s 
history… For whatever reason, political talk and action begin to take on an 
urgency and breadth lacking most of the time. Normally passive citizens become 
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more active – arguing, mobilizing, and sacrificing their other interests to a degree 
that seems to them extraordinary.455 
 
This sounds much like both the Scottish Constitutional Convention and the recent 
referendum. The ordinary politics of the economy, inequality and public spending were 
sublimated into the national question of devolution and then Scottish independence. It is 
important to keep in mind that for Ackerman referendums do not necessarily constitution 
constitutional moments in and of themselves: ‘the referendum retains its democratic appeal 
under the special conditions of constitutional politics—when millions of citizens have 
indeed been mobilized and confront the political agenda with a rare seriousness.”456  
 
In spite of this, we can apply a somewhat amended Ackerman’s principles of change 
outlined above to Scotland. The signaling and proposal phases of the Scottish question 
may have been a gradual and slow one. The Scottish National Party’s rise to prominence 
and the period of dissatisfaction and constitutional awareness of the 1980s and 1990s 
amount to the signaling phase. The demand for a Scottish Parliament constitutes the 
proposal. The trigger is the 1997 election of the pro-devolution Labour Party. The 
mobilized popular deliberation phase took place in the 1997 Referendum, and the courts 
and political institutions have been grappling with the final phase ever since.  
 
Here, the interplay between formal and informal methods of amending the constitution can 
be mapped. The formal mechanism by which the Scottish Parliament was introduced was 
the Scotland Act 1998. As we have seen, the Act’s content was heavily influenced by the 
Scottish Constitutional Convention’s work and the democratic mandate granted to the 
proposals by the 1997 Referendum. The courts’ interpretations of the devolution scheme 
have also been heavily coloured by the genesis of the proposals and the imprimatur of 
popular sovereignty upon them as well as the democratic nature of the Scottish Parliament. 
The idea of the “settled will of the Scottish people’, although problematic, is significant to 
the interpretation and practice of the devolution arrangements. It is used to explain the 
putatively superior democratic legitimacy of the Scottish Parliament over Westminster and 
to limit tinkering with the fundamentals of the devolution arrangements. It is not only the 
1997 Referendum itself that constitutes this limit, but the continued support, expressed 
formally at elections and informally through opinion polls and general popular 
                                                             
455 Ackerman, Transformations n.439, 6. 
456 Ibid 41. 
82 
engagement, for the Scottish Parliament. In Ackermenian terms, it possesses “enhanced 
legitimacy” and ought to be provided with superior respect to ensure that it has an 
“enduring future in political life.”457 
 
The process was, however, reset by the trigger phase of the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary 
Election. When the SNP gained an unexpected majority in the Scottish Parliament, 
Scottish independence was placed at the centre of Scottish political life. It became the 
proposal to be assessed by the People. It was rejected, but, with the Smith Commission 
proposals and a more nebulous sense of political change, it is clear that, in spite of this, the 
final stage has still been met. The proposal – Scotland leaving the United Kingdom – has 
mutated into a demand for general constitutional change, embodied in a significantly more 
powerful and explicitly permanent Scottish Parliament.  
 
5.3 Walker’s Constitutional Unsettlement 
 
For Ackerman, a new constitutional approach is imbued with legitimacy by its capacity to 
channel contending political forces into itself:  
 
This is the point at which the higher lawmaking system confronts its greatest 
challenge: Can it channel the contending parties into an energetic exchange of 
public views, inviting them to address each other’s critiques as they seek to 
mobilize deeper and broader support from the general citizenry?... In a single line: 
will the system encourage the protagonists to talk to one another or past one 
another?458 
 
The SNP’s involvement in the Smith Commission may give the impression that the 
protagonists in Scotland’s constitutional order have been encouraged to talk to rather than 
past one another. It is clear, however, that the SNP remain dissatisfied with British 
constitutional arrangements even with the full adoption of the Smith proposals. 
 
The SNP’s landslide victory in the May 2015 General Election in Scotland has led to 
continued calls for devolution beyond that envisioned by the Smith Commission.459 At a 
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minimum, the Smith Commission proposals are very likely to be passed. For some, this 
amounts to a new constitutional settlement for Scotland, which would settle the question of 
Scottish independence for a generation or more. 
 
A very different view of the British constitutional order can be found in Neil Walker’s 
depiction of a constitutional unsettlement.460 Professor Walker posits that Britain has 
entered a period not simply of prolonged constitutional change, but of indefinite 
constitutional disorder and disagreement. 
 
For a definition of the opposite a constitutional unsettlement, a settled constitution, Walker 
turns to Professor Bogdanor’s depiction of the ‘Old Constitution.’461 This comprises 
parliamentary sovereignty, and an evolutionary and gradualist approach to constitutional 
change, as described by Bagehot.462 These complementary principles have, together with 
the absence of any revolutionary act, militated against wholesale constitutional redesign. 
The British constitution was, therefore, for centuries a settled constitution. 
 
That is not to say that there it was an unchanging and static constitution. The British 
constitution has gone through vast changes. It is the pace of change and its lack of 
infringement upon central constitutional principles that rendered it settled. As Walker 
notes:  
primary constitutional conflicts within the settled constitution rarely struck to 
constitutional fundamentals - Neither by intensity nor scope of ambition is there a 
challenge to the very foundations of the order.463 
 
5.3.1 An Unsettled Constitution  
 
This position – broadly – held until the 1970s, with Britain’s accession to the European 
Union. The unsettlement was accelerated by the significant constitutional reforms enacted 
by the 1997 Labour government, including devolution, the Human Rights Act 1998, the 
inception of the Supreme Court, the fundamental restructuring of the House of Lords, 
Freedom of Information legislation and the abolition of many of the roles of the Lord 
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Chancellor.464 These vast changes have combined to erode both the traditional principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty and the evolutionary approach to constitutional change. It has 
also been haphazard, unsystematic, and self-perpetuating: 
 
Just as parliamentary sovereignty and the evolutionary constitution fed off each 
other, so too the erosion of parliamentary sovereignty and declining investment in 
the settled constitution and in a gradualist approach to its development are 
mutually suggestive and reinforcing trends.465 
 
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty has been the locus of the primary disputes of 
contemporary constitutionalism, for example the critique originating from common law 
constitutionalism.466 In the settled constitutional order of the past such disputes would not 
have arisen. Indeed, Walker argues, the political, academic and legal elites who would 
have accepted parliamentary sovereignty and the evolutionary constitution as axiomatic in 
the past now question and, in some instances, reject it. Allied with the contemporary 
challenges of globalization and technological change, these forces conspire to create an 
unsettled constitution that queries its fundamental tenets. Even now, devolution is 
described by other writers as “deeply unstable."467  
Walker turns to what the unsettled constitution may lead to. There are various answers to 
this. Firstly, some believe it to be a relatively brief episode of unsettlement that will 
eventually return to its settled state. A second approach views the recent rapid change in 
the constitution as representative of ‘a new equilibrium committed to ongoing 
constitutional adjustment.’468 A third regards the unsettled constitution as a necessary step 
towards a new era of constitutional settlement.       
 
These are unsatisfactory. The first two are contradicted by the ongoing unsettlement of the 
constitution embodied in the European Union Act 2011, the Fixed Term Parliament Act 
2010 and the ongoing lack of consensus on Britain’s constitutional fundamentals. The third 
seems unlikely in that this constitutional change lacks a unifying purpose; it lacks a clear 
destination. Moreover, the British polity is so riven with contradictory forces and actors 
who disagree on constitutional fundamentals that gaining sufficient unity of purpose and 
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agreement in order to achieve a constitutional settlement appears improbable. Indeed, there 
exists a ‘paradox of initiative’ that ‘militate[s] against the generation of a common political 
will necessary’ to create a new settlement.469 For example, Scottish nationalists form the 
Scottish government and seek to break the union; how could they agree in good faith to a 
new constitutional settlement for a United Kingdom? 
 
5.3.2 Constitutional Unsettlement 
 
This all leads to the sense that a third description of British constitutional arrangements is 
needed. For Walker, this is a constitutional unsettlement. This is  
 
… a combination of certain deep-lying, historically informed structural features of 
the constitution which contribute to and flow from the closing off of [the options 
outlined immediately above] as viable alternatives, together with the mindset this 
structural background tends to encourage.470 
  
Walker elaborates on this loose definition by identifying trends in recent constitutional 
history. Firstly the forces that have created the constitutional unsettlement are self-
perpetuating. Parliamentary sovereignty remains the central tenet of the British constitution 
to which all constitutional reforms must refer, either in support of or opposition to it. The 
mechanisms of channeling these challenges are generally polarizing and do not encourage 
reconciliation or deliberation. Parliamentary sovereignty becomes “part of the problem, or 
at least to be viewed as such – staunchly defended or implicitly relied upon on the one 
hand, and treated as part of the very pathology to be resisted or overturned on the other” 
rather than a mechanism of resolving such tensions.471 
 
Secondly, constitutional change has been ad hoc and disordered. The methods of 
constitutional change have been improvised. Sometimes Parliamentary committees, 
referendums and Commissions have been used to propose constitutional change. However, 
“they are often of uncertain authority” and “encourages a continuing disputation and 
accompanying meta-conversation about constitutional fitness for purpose, but one where 
by definition there is no authoritative method to resolve or even to hold the debate.”472 
                                                             
469 Ibid 542. 
470 Ibid. 
471 Ibid 543. 
472 Ibid 545. 
86 
 
Thirdly, the forces that create unsettlement – Scottish nationalism, opposition to Britain’s 
membership of the European Union – conspire against settlement. This, along with the 
nature of events surrounding the factors, means that unsettlement becomes insoluble and 
unavoidable. 
 
Finally, “there are so many sites of uncertainty and fluctuating movements, and so 
interconnected are these, that the overall profile of the constitutional unsettlement is likely 
to remain fluid and changeable.”473 The scale and profundity of the disputes surrounding 
the status of a separate Scotland’s international status demonstrates that unsettlement 
pervades all aspects of the constitution.474 
 
Walker then argues that constitutional unsettlement is desirable, in that it recognises the 
reality of the British political situation. Importantly, he notes that  
 
unsettlement, if looked squarely in the face, may turn out to be a “least worst” 
solution for a world in which constitutional sovereignty, both as an organizing 
device and as a measure of belonging, is not what it used to be.475  
 
Walker’s thesis is a convincing depiction of the contemporary constitutional order. His 
depiction of a constitutional order in a state of fundamental flux, where there is not only 
limited consensus on constitutional fundamentals today, but also little hope for it in the 
future, seems increasingly accurate by the day. The key question is what this unsettlement 
means for parliamentary sovereignty in Scotland. 
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Chapter 6: Sovereignty Unsettled: Conclusions 
 
What does this constitutional unsettlement mean for the Scottish Parliament’s status in the 
British constitution? The changes to Scotland’s constitutional status that have occurred in 
the last twenty years are undoubtedly vast. As Bagehot observed, 
 
[a] new constitution does not does not produce its full effect as long as all its 
subjects were reared under an old Constitution, as long as its statesmen were 
trained by that old Constitution. It is not really tested till it comes to be worked by 
statesmen and among a people neither of whom are guided by a different 
experience.476 
 
It may, therefore, be some time before the full ramifications of recent constitutional change 
will be felt. As Professor Little noted over a decade ago 
 
It should… be appreciated that the politics of post-devolution Scotland may, over 
time, bring powerful, complex and possibly irresistible pressures to bear on the 
orthodox doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, making it increasingly difficult to 
reconcile with constitutional theory, and, ultimately, leading to the development of 
a new politico-legal order.477 
 
The position is fluid. Walker believes that the ‘Scottish question is reaching a defining 
moment.’478 But this need not necessarily be the case. 
 
6.1 Scottish Constitutionalism 
 
We have seen that claims to a peculiarly Scottish popular sovereignty are of limited 
historical value. However, in spite of its “romantic novelist”479 approach to Scottish 
constitutionalism, this organizing myth has morphed into a practical reality as a 
consequence of the struggles of the Scottish Constitutional Convention and its 
endorsement in the Scotland Act 1998. The Claim of Right, signed by representatives of all 
parties and praised by the Labour government of 1997, has helped insert popular 
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sovereignty into the firmament of the Scottish constitutional order. The SCC filled the 
vacuum of legitimacy left by the British state and filled it with a claim to a modified form 
of popular sovereignty. It is now almost universally acknowledged that profound, 
‘constitution-framing’ change in the Scottish constitution would require a referendum to 
possess any legitimacy.480 The Scottish people’s constituent power is a force that has 
challenged the “juridical system from the outside” and now, even though it has been 
“institutionalised” can “re-emerge at any moment to destabilise it.”481  It is in this sense 
that we can say that we have a dualist constitution, in the sense outlined by Bruce 
Ackerman described above. Through general acceptance, we can see that there is a 
political imperative to hold referendums in circumstances that implicate the foundations of 
the constitution in Scotland. This is very different to a legal imperative, however.  
 
6.1.1 The Scotland Act 2012 
 
A complicating factor in the argument that the use of referendums has inserted a form of 
popular sovereignty into the Scottish constitution is the transfer of powers within the 
Scotland Act 2012. In the aftermath of the 2007 Scottish Parliament election the unionist 
parties in Scotland formed the Calman Commission to examine the devolution 
settlement.482 Its findings were largely accepted by those parties, and the coalition 
government enacted them in the Scotland Act 2012. This transferred many powers to the 
Scottish Parliament, most significantly wide powers to vary income tax.483 It also invested 
in the Scottish Parliament the competence to legislate on drink driving and speed limits, 
and broadened the powers of the Scottish Ministers in some regards as well as changed the 
title of the Scottish Executive to the Scottish Government. This process was completed 
using traditional parliamentary procedures, without recourse to the people. 
 
This lack of plebiscite is ostensibly a challenge to the thesis of this article. In fact, it is not. 
An examination of the 2012 Act demonstrates that it does not change the fundamental 
Scottish constitutional settlement. The powers transferred are substantial, but are broadly 
related to the competences of the Scottish Parliament. Even the substantial tax varying 
power can be conceived of as an extension of the existing tax varying power, which was 
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ratified by the people in 1997. No new institution or arrangement is constituted which 
mediates the relationship between the Scottish people and the state; it is an extension of the 
principles accepted by the people in the 1997 referendum and constituting the 1998 Act. 
The settled will of the Scottish people was not the precise distribution of powers envisaged 
by the 1998 Act,484 but the institution it created and the principle of devolution it 
confirmed. The constituent power sought an institutional solution in the Scottish 
Parliament to a political problem. The 2012 Act is a continuation of the existing 
devolutionary process rather than the beginning of a new one. A referendum would have 
been unnecessary. 
 
The 2012 Act can be contrasted with the contemporaneous changes to the position of the 
Welsh Assembly. After a unanimous vote in favour of more powers to the Welsh 
Assembly by its members in 2010, the British Government held a referendum in 2011on 
whether full primary legislative competency should be devolved to the Welsh Assembly. 
This is in contrast with the prior status of the Assembly, which between 1999 and 2006 had 
no primary legislative powers. After the introduction of the Government of Wales Act 
2006 and until 2012 its primary legislation – which could only be introduced on limited 
terms – required Westminster’s assent. The granting of primary legislative competency to 
the Welsh Assembly was a clear alteration to the constitutional status of the Assembly, and 




What impact does this change and the two referendums have on the constitutional status of 
the devolution? One writer contends that use of the referendum ‘… seems one way in 
which constitutional reform can come to terms with the realities of social change at the end 
of the twentieth century.’485 Another notes that ‘…the referendum offered dissenting 
political actors a vehicle for popular revolt, legitimizing and in due course foreclosing acts 
of constitutional rupture through direct popular intervention’486 and that ‘…by the late 
twentieth century for the first time the referendum had become for many an automatic part 
of constituent constitutionalism and even of the constitutional amendment process.’487  
 
                                                             
484 Although it was in accordance with the broad thrust of the Act. 
485 Bogdanor, The New British Constitution n.221, 48. 
486 Tierney, Referendums n.363, 7. 
487 Ibid 10. 
 90 
Due to the constitutional moment that we continue to live through, the referendum is 
now an axiomatic component of the Scottish constitutional order. As noted above, it does 
not supplant representative democracy. Instead, it intervenes when ‘issues of such 
fundamental importance that a parliamentary verdict is by itself insufficient to ensure 
legitimacy’ arise.488 It now forms part of the Scottish constitutional architecture. 
 
In law, however, there is no requirement for a referendum in any context in Scotland. 
Goldsworthy believes that ‘To seek to bind future parliaments by prohibiting the 
enactment of legislation without a referendum first being held is not consistent with the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.'489 The effect of a constitutional moment in the UK 
is not to create a legal limitation, but a political one, as described by Dicey. But this does 
not make it any less influential on constitutional actions. The demand for a referendum in 
2014 was purely political; there was no constitutional requirement for it to take place. Yet, 
in reality, it was no less certain to occur than if there were a statutory requirement for it. It 
is unlikely that a constitutional convention yet exists requiring a referendum on 
fundamental constitutional issues in Scotland, but the political constitution unambiguously 
requires it.  
 
This means that there is no legal mechanism of enforcement for such a requirement. 
Similarly, the Edinburgh Agreement possessed no enforcement mechanism and possessed 
no direct legal significance. One writer’s words on the topic can be applied more broadly 
than the Edinburgh Agreement: 
 
No-one much cares whether the Edinburgh Agreement has legal status or not 
because it may simply not matter.  The Agreement has perhaps all the ingredients 
for successful auto-enforcement: tight legal drafting, a culture of governments 
honouring formal commitments, and reciprocal self-interest locked down by the 
reputational costs of breach.  It is difficult to see how the ‘added-value’ of a legal 
agreement - court enforcement - would help.  These ingredients will either remain 
or will not: if the Agreement self-executes no court is necessary, while if a party for 
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some presently unpredictable reason pushes a ‘destruct’ button, no court is 
sufficient.490  
 
The lack of legal enforceability did not prevent the Edinburgh Agreement from possessing 
significant normative force. In the same way, the normative effect of the 1997 and 2014 
referendums is substantial. There is now an “[i]mplied constitutional self-determination”491 
principle in the Scottish constitutional order. 
 
6.3 Reflecting the Permanence of the Scottish Parliament 
 
The Smith Commission recommended and the UK government intends to include in 
legislation an unambiguous statement that reflects the constitutional permanence of the 
Scottish Parliament.492 Clause 1 of the new Scotland Clauses proposes inserting a new 
declaration in to the Scotland Act 1998 that: “A Scottish Parliament is recognised as a 
permanent part of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements.’493 This echoes the 
writings of the former Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. Brown explains that 
 
Because the UK constitution is unwritten, or more accurately uncodified, there is 
an assumption that promises made in one parliament need not be honoured by the 
next or successive parliaments. So, in traditional legal theory at least, the Scottish 
Parliament could be dissolved or see its powers cut as one UK Parliament becomes 
another.  
 
Of course Scotland’s position within the UK is, as it has always been, a matter that 
the Scottish people can decide. We know that in reality the vote of the Scottish 
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But in my view the parliament has not just to be, but also has to be seen to be, 
permanent, entrenched in the constitution and indissoluble. We would in effect be 
building a constitutional pillar that lays to res the idea that devolution was simply 
at the discretion of the UK parliament, and replacing that outdated idea with an 
irreversible and enduring political settlement guaranteed by the constitution. 494 
 
Something similar to this was enacted in relation to Northern Ireland. Section 1 of the 
Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 provided that  
 
…[It] is hereby affirmed that in no event will Northern Ireland or any part of it 
cease to be part of Her Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom without the 
consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll.... 
 
The obvious distinction between the 1973 section and the proposed clause is the 
requirement for some form of plebiscite in the former. In any event, as was discussed in a 
previous chapter, its legal effect of the proposed clause would last only as long as the Act 
remained in force, i.e. parliament could repeal it at any time. However, as Dicey said 
 
… the enactment of laws which are described as unchangeable, immutable, or the 
like, is not necessarily futile--A sovereign Parliament--although it cannot be 
logically bound to abstain from changing any given law, may, by the fact that an 
Act when it was passed had been declared to be unchangeable, receive a warning 
that it cannot be changed without grave danger to the Constitution of the 
country.495  
 
It has been suggested that 
 
as a matter of legislative intent, in the forms used, as much as the alternatives 
foregone, there must be meaning. Taking the Supreme Court case-law together with 
the ‘Scotland clauses’, I suggest that a definite and entirely domestic boundary of 
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Parliamentary supremacy is emerging. That is the meaning and intent of these 
clauses of the Scotland Bill.496 
 
But what gives the clauses meaning is the political intent. If this political intent alters in 
line with the will of the people, then the clauses would be animated by an entirely different 
set of principles. No permanent legal limitation on Westminster’s sovereignty flows from 
the proposed clause.497  As Elliot notes, there is no ‘contingent entrenchment’ proposed in 
the clauses. This would assert that ‘section 1(1) of the Scotland Act 1998 could not be 
repealed or amended except in defined circumstances…’498 Such an approach would be of 
dubious utility and wholly unnecessary as they are politically entrenched. 
 
As noted above499, the Acts and Treaty of Union provide no mechanism for judicial 
enforcement of their terms. In fact, several less important terms have been breached. 
However, the essential terms – the retention of separate legal and education systems and a 
distinct established church – remain unaltered. They are part of the constitutional 
firmament, politically entrenched. The Scottish Parliament may be in a similar 
constitutional position. 
 
6.4 Can Westminster Abolish the Scottish Parliament Unilaterally? 
 
That legal form must march beside political reality is now axiomatic. The complicating 
factor is the indefinite constitutional unsettlement in which we live. The Smith 
Commission is unlikely to introduce much additional settlement into the Scottish 
constitutional order.500 It is also not necessarily the case that it is a stepping-stone to yet 
further powers for the Scottish Parliament beyond those suggested by the Smith 
Commission. The fact that the institution’s legitimacy is predicated unambiguously on 
popular sovereignty means that this legitimacy may be withdrawn at any point by the 
Scottish people. The Northern Irish experience of devolution, though mediated through 
sectarian and other tensions of less consequence in Scottish politics, is of waxing and 
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waning support for Stormont and periods of intense displeasure with the devolutionary 
arrangements. Whilst Scottish self-government is far less contentious and bound up in 
external factors than Northern Irish devolution, it is not entirely unthinkable that a similar 
situation could arise. Its very possibility is a logical consequence of popular sovereignty. 
 
It remains unlikely that any court would seek to prevent Westminster from unilaterally 
abolishing the Scottish Parliament. The Welsh Asbestos Case not withstanding, we saw 
that the courts have geberally adopted an increasingly nuanced and accommodative 
approach to the Scottish Parliament’s constitutional status. Lord Hope’s dictum in Axa is 
illustrative of a sensitive approach being adopted by the courts, focusing on the Scottish 
Parliament’s democratic status. But, ultimately, the courts recognize that the Scottish 
Parliament is not a sovereign legislature and retain the kernel of relative judicial deference 
that continues to characterize the British judiciary. If the Supreme Court did seek to 
emulate its Canadian counterpart by adopting a Quebec Secession Reference style 
approach to constitutional first principles, it would attempt to do so in such a way that did 
not endanger the delicate comity that exists between the courts and Parliament. The courts 
would have to infer a principle of respect for devolution from relatively recent 
constitutional practice. However, much like in relation to the Quebec Secession Reference, 
this would be an example of the courts overstepping their constitutional position. It is not 
for courts to develop recent government policy and parliamentary practice into 
constitutional principle unilaterally. As Cane put it, "the idea that courts or the common 
law occupy some sort of moral high ground in the constitutional landscape is, I think, one 
of which we should be very wary."501  
 
Broadly speaking, Westminster seeking to abolish the Scottish Parliament unilaterally 
would indubitably create a constitutional crisis.502 In such situations: 
 
the popular political momentum carried by a referendum can bring with it vital 
constitutional imperatives which a supreme court, to remain relevant, can neither 
ignore nor approach through the mode of a narrow traditional positivism that does 
not speak to political reality.503 
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Whether the Supreme Court sought a creative, principle-based solution similar to the 
Secession Reference or not, the result of such an act by Westminster would almost 
certainly be Scotland leaving the United Kingdom. It is for this reason that it is so unlikely 
to occur. 
 
In practice, the recognition by successive governments of a right of self-determination has 
created an irresistible political requirement for referendums for significant constitutional 
change. The 1997 Referendum is an example of a constitution-changing constitution. The 
2014 Referendum was constituted as a constitution-framing referendum, but has become a 
hybrid of the two in that, whilst it has demonstratively not created a new nation or 
constitution, it has brought about, albeit indirectly, a profoundly altered constitutional 
terrain. It has been a foundational act, ‘… bringing about a clear break in the old order… 
[and] imbu[ing] the new construct with a new popular source of legitimacy.’504 Tierney 
explains that 
 
In a number of situations the referendum is in fact invoked within one 
constitutional order but in the course of the constitutional process of which it is the 
culmination the referendum comes to take on constitutive potential, rupturing and 
supplanting the existing system.505 
 
Thus, the 2014 referendum confirms the significance of popular sovereignty and principles 
of self-determination in the Scottish constitution. It also reaffirms the commitment of even 
those who wish to make Scotland an independent country to the practical mechanics of 
Parliamentary sovereignty.506  
Such a political requirement, accompanied by long usage, may lead to the creation of a 
constitutional convention that a referendum be necessary for the abolition of the Scottish 
Parliament.507 As Vermeule describes in relation to Declarations of Incompatability under 
the Human Rights Act 1998, situations arise in which 
Parliament feels constrained to comply with declarations out of a belief—a 
possibly false but untested belief—that there will be a political backlash if it fails to 
do so, or at least if it conspicuously fails to do so belief persists for long enough, so 
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that it comes to seem the normal state that Parliament complies, one can expect 
the growth of a constitutional convention that Parliament is obligated to comply. A 
departure from the norm would then provoke outrage among legal elites and the 
public, so that the initially false belief would have become true, but only because it 
produced a record of Parliamentary compliance that caused it to become true, and 
thus fulfilled itself.508 
A similar state of affairs may arise in relation to a referendum requirement to authorize the 
abolition of the Scottish Parliament. The provision indicating the Scottish Parliament’s 
permanence further acts to ‘supply a statement of intent that the politically inconceivable 
step of effecting such an abolition would not be taken by a sovereign Parliament 
legally capable of doing so.’509 Although constitutional conventions and political 
necessities are not judicially enforceable, as we saw in relation to the Edinburgh 
Agreement, they are powerful normative forces.  
 
The approach adopted by Westminster to the 2014 Referendum demonstrates a political 
sensitivity to the Scottish question. The relevant legislation was amended in order to 
sidestep legal challenges to the Scottish Parliament legislating for the referendum that the 
Scottish Government had been given a mandate to hold.  
 
But it is also clear that no constitutional settlement has resulted from this. The 2014 
Referendum has crystalized many more new and fundamental questions than it has 
answered. Bogdanor is correct to observe that Westminster’s ability to abolish the Scottish 
Parliament is now “…perhaps somewhat theoretical...”510 and that parliament’s 
sovereignty over Scotland now amounts to something far less than Diceyan “unlimited 
power.”’511 The use of referendums in Scotland has undermined the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty in practice, but the internal logic of parliamentary sovereignty 
will not permit this theoretical power to be formally dismissed. In reality, the political 
principle of popular sovereignty in Scotland, as rendered by the Scottish Constitutional 
Convention and made concrete in the 1997 and 2014 Referendums as well as the daily 
existence of the Scottish Parliament, acts as a de facto barrier to Westminster abolishing or 
restricting Holyrood’s powers unilaterally. But this cannot be acknowledged in a legal 
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sense without dismantling parliamentary sovereignty. This is a major contributory factor 
to the constitutional unsettlement. As one writer put it:  
 
… [T]he [Scottish] Question will remain unanswered definitively not least because 
it is more than one question but crucially because it includes a series of 
relationships that need to be addressed anew in each generation. These 
relationships are, like nations, daily plebiscites. There can be no final resolution to 
the Scottish Question for that reason.512 
 
For some, such a position of perpetual unsettlement would be undesirable. Legal 
constitutionalists would certainly seek a settled constitution. But we have seen that such 
settlement is unlikely to come about. In any event, the universal contemporary challenges 
to classical conceptions of sovereignty – particularly globalization – mean that a monistic, 
immutable conception of constitutionalism is of decreasing relevance and accuracy. A 
recognition of the reality of the United Kingdom’s plurinational status, with competing 
conceptions of principles as fundamental as sovereignty, may be a more realistic approach 
than those of countries with ostensibly settled constitutions.  
 
Disagreement and contestation is not to be feared; it is an accurate depiction of 
contemporary polities. For example, the 1997 Devolution Referendum was won with 
nearly 75% support, whereas only 55% of electors voted to stay in the UK in the 2014 
Referendum.  Consensus is increasingly illusive. The purpose of contemporary 
constitutionalism must be to create forums and mechanisms for tentative resolutions of 
disputes, rather than attempts to stifle debates on constitutional fundamentals with false 
and superficial consensuses. Such compromises are immanently political rather than legal 
in character.  As Waldron puts it 
 
Disagreement on matters of principle is… not the exception but the rule in politics. 
It follows that those who value popular participation in politics should not value it 
in a spirit that stops short at the threshold of disagreements about rights. Such 
curtailment, I believe, betrays the spirit of those who struggled for democracy and 
universal suffrage… They did not do them simply for the sake of a vote on 
interstitial issues of policy that had no compelling moral dimension. They fought 
for the franchise because they believed that controversies about the fundamental 
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ordering of their society… were controversies for them to sort out, respectfully 
and on a basis of equality, because they were the people who would be affected by 
the outcome. Moreover, they did not fight for the vote on the assumption that they 
would then all agree about the issues that they wanted the right to vote on. Every 
individual involved in these movements was well aware that there were others 
standing alongside him who believed that his political views on matters of 
substance were mistaken. But they fought for the vote anyway on the ground that 
the existence of such principled disagreements was the essence of politics, not that 
it should be regarded as a signal to transfer the important issues that they 
disagreed about to some other forum altogether, which would privilege the 
opinions and purses of a few.513 
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